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I. PROLOGUE
As I remembered it from law school (Property I, fall semester,
1961), once you closed, that was it! If a purchaser later on discovered a
problem for which his seller would unquestionably be responsible under
the contract of purchase and sale, forget it! That contract died. Some-
thing about a "doctrine of merger" that prevented suing on the original
contract after the deal had closed.
So when the client walked into my office in 1979 (some eighteen
years after my first encounter with "merger" back in Property I) com-
plaining of no access to his recently purchased 4.5 acres of vacant land,
my gut reaction (after first giving thanks that I had not represented
him on the purchase) was: Forget it! "Merger" will preclude an action
against his seller despite the seller's warranty of access under the con-
tract of purchase and sale.
Preliminary research confirmed my recollection about the doctrine
of merger, but also revealed that there were of course several excep-
tions to the doctrine. Maybe we could fall within one of those excep-
tions. Besides, we might also be of service to the client by obtaining
access for his property ("right-of-way of necessity" rang another bell
from Property I).
So, we took the case, and not without surprise summary judgment
was promptly entered against us on our breach of contract action
against the seller: The doctrine of merger barred our action.1 The ap-
pellate court reversed, however, and sustained our claim, finding that
we did in fact fall within one of those exceptions to the merger rule;2
and the Florida Supreme Court upheld that ruling by denying
certiorari.3
Now, another ten years have gone by and, having left private prac-
tice for the world of academia, I find myself teaching the doctrine of
merger in Property class. This has prodded me to re-examine the rule
and the growth of exceptions to the rule, and what I see is repeated
misuse of the doctrine. If you'll stick with me for a while, I shall hope
to adequately convey to you 1) why I conclude that the doctrine of
merger has been bastardized, and 2) what I believe is the more legiti-
1. Opler v. LaValle, No. 80-4345 (Fla. llth Cir. Ct. 1980).
2. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981). Author's
note: This is, of course, the same case as noted in the previous footnote.
3. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied,
412 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1982).
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mate conceptual approach to analyzing these cases, namely that while
there are a limited number of prescribed circumstances in which the
doctrine of merger is the correct rule to apply, the vast majority of the
factual situations should be viewed under the rules of accord and
satisfaction.
II. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of merger, as it pertains to real estate transactions, is
so easily and clearly stated as to defy its complexity: The covenants of
the contract of purchase and sale are merged into the deed of convey-
ance upon the closing of the transaction, and such covenants are there-
after no longer enforceable."
The exceptions to the doctrine, and the circumstances under which
the doctrine is "inapplicable," are not so easily or clearly stated: Yet
the number of recent Florida cases declining to apply the rule exceeds
the quantity of cases in which the rule has been applied;5 . . . which
causes one to wonder: Have the exceptions overtaken the rule? More
importantly, this provokes us to inquire whether the rule and its excep-
tions are being properly applied.
This article: 1) examines the history of and basis for the doctrine
of merger as it applies to real estate contracts; 2) traces the develop-
ment of the doctrine in Florida; 3) reveals a confusion in the case law
in Florida, demonstrated by an attempt to categorize the various cases
by those in which the doctrine is adhered to, versus those which fall
within various exceptions to the rule; 4) attempts to analyze why the
rule has, or has not, been applied in various situations; and 5) con-
cludes that there is a rational basis conceptually and under very recent
Florida case law for discerning when to apply the rule, and that the
more appropriate doctrine to apply in most cases is that of accord and
satisfaction.
IIL HISTORY AND BASIS OF THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER
A classic statement of the merger doctrine is:
4. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 413 (1932); see also ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM
ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.12, at 696-97 (1984).
5. See APPENDIX OF FLORIDA CASES DEALING WITH THE DOCTRINE OF
MERGER, infra [hereinafter APPENDIX].
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In the absence of fraud or mistake, and in the absence of collateral
contractual provisions or agreements which are not intended to be
merged in the deed, the acceptance of a deed tendered in perform-
ance of an agreement to convey merges the written or oral agree-
ment to convey in the deed, the agreement to convey being dis-
charged or modified as indicated by the deed, and thereafter the
deed regulates the rights and liabilities of the parties, and evidence
of contemporaneous or antecedent agreements between the parties
is inadmissible to vary or contradict the terms of the deed.'
Similarly, but more simply stated, the Florida courts have repeat-
edly stated the rule "that preliminary agreements and understandings
relative to the sale of property usually merge in the deed executed pur-
suant thereto,"'7 and "acceptance of a deed tendered in performance of
a contract to convey merges or extinguishes the covenants and stipula-
tions contained in the contract .... 198
The classic statement of the doctrine of merger (hereinafter some-
times referred to simply as "the doctrine" or "the rule") has been re-
peated so frequently in essentially the form and substance as quoted
above, that the courts and commentators may have lost sight of why
the doctrine calls for the result of "extinguishing" the covenants of the
contract.
The basis of the rule originates in the common law of England:
Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, states that
"whenever a greater estate and a less coincide and meet in one and the
same person, without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately
annihilated; or, in the law phrase, is said to be merged, that is sunk or
drowned in the greater."9 Thus, with regard to the effect of the real
6. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 240(1)(b), 413 (1932). Because, as above
quoted, such evidence is "inadmissible to vary or contradict" the deed, the parol evi-
dence rule is sometimes stated as the basis for the merger rule, or it is said that the two
rules are equated to or associated with each other. Professor Corbin disapproves of that
connection, because the parol evidence rule is premised on the theory that the docu-
ment represents the complete integration of the parties' discussions, negotiations and
transaction, rather than operating to discharge an earlier agreement (as the deed oper-
ates to discharge the earlier contract under the merger rule). See 6 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1319, at 316 (1962); 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 587, at 506 (1960).
7. Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
8. Id.
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property conveyance on the antecedent contract of sale, it is said that
"[t]he lesser equitable estate created by the contract is necessarily
merged in and swallowed up by the legal estate created by the deed."10
As early as 1811,11 and in a series of 1800s cases thereafter, 2 the
common law of England had come to recognize this specific aspect of
the doctrine of merger relating to real property contracts of sale merg-
ing into the deed of conveyance. Foremost among the reasons for appli-
cation of merger to real estate contracts in the early English cases, was
"functus officio,"- 3-the need for certainty and finality in land transac-
tions, a point after which buyer and seller could no longer pursue
claims under the contract."' The functus officio rationale is the natural
consequence of the court's recognition that parties to a contract for sale
were entitled to (and frequently do) modify the contract (either know-
ingly,, or without conscious act) prior to performance thereof;
and--according to the law (and the needs of society)-there must
come a point in time when all of these modifications reach fruition and
are resolved with finality. That point is signified by the parties' issuance
and acceptance of the instrument of conveyance, which is nothing more
than recognition of the elementary principle that a later agreement su-
persedes an earlier agreement addressing the same subject matter.15
At the same historical point in time, the early 1800s, American
courts were likewise espousing the rule," recognizing that "[a]rticles of
agreement for the conveyance of land are, in their nature, executory,
and the acceptance of a deed, in pursuance thereof, is to be deemed,
10. French v. McMillion, 91 S.E. 538 (W. Va. 1917) (the principle is well set-
tled that a contract of sale is merged into the deed).
11. Legge v. Croker 1 Ball & B. 506, 12 R.R. 49 (Ir. Ch.) (1811).
12. Id.; see also Brownlie v, Campbell 5 App. Case. 925 (H.L. 1880); Allen v.
Richardson 13 Ch. D. 524 (1879); Besley v. Besley 9 Ch. D. 103 (1878); Mason v.
Thacker 7 Ch. D. 620 (1878); Wilde v. Gibson 1 H.L. Case. 605, 73 R.R. 191 (1848).
13. Functus Officio is defined as "A task performed. Having fulfilled the function
.Applied to . . . an instrument . . which has fulfilled the purpose of its crea-
tion, and is therefore of no further virtue or effect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 606
(5th ed. 1979); and "[O]f no further official authority or legal efficacy .... WEB-
STER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 921 (1981).
14. "No rule of law is better settled than where a deed has been executed and
accepted as performance of an executory contract to convey real estate, the contract is
functus officio, and the rights of the parties rest thereafter solely on the deed." R.
DEVLIN, THE LAW OF DEEDS § 850a, at 1571 (3d ed. 1911).
15. See Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.2D 1310 (1954).
16. Houghtaling v. Lewis, 10 Johns. 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); Howes v. Barker,
3 Johns. 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
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prima facie, an execution of the contract, and the agreement thereby
becomes void, and of no further effect."" Indeed, in Howes,'8 Chief
Justice Kent placed such emphasis on the merger rule that he referred
to the deed as an insurmountable "impediment" to an action on the
earlier contract-the deed being "the highest evidence of the final
agreement of the parties."9
The doctrine of merger is said to be justified on the basis of vari-
ous, stated reasons ° other than, or in addition to, "functus officio."
Nevertheless, no matter what the stated rationale, thorough analysis
will always bring us back to the basis for the rule being that property
transactions are inherently a "two-act" play2" in which the two acts are
separated by a lengthy "intermission;"22 that the parties may during
the intermission actually or impliedly change their initial agreement
("Act I"); and that whether or not they did in fact evoke a change, the
second act (the closing) is deemed to carry out and fulfill the first act
(the contract), so that the first act has been "swallowed up ' 23 and is of
no further legal effect.2
Along with the development of the merger doctrine to extinguish
rights and obligations under the initial contract, there grew a series of
exceptions to the rule that are utilized by the courts in those instances
in which it would be inequitable, inappropriate, or simply unfair 25 to
17. Houghtaling v. Lewis, 10 Johns. 297, 299 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813).
18. Howes v. Barker, 3 Johns. 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1808).
19. Id. at 528.
20. Other reasons for the doctrine: "Caveat emptor," the purchaser has a duty to
investigate the title of the vendor. See Lyn L. Stevens, The Role Of The Doctrine Of
Merger In Contracts For The Sale Of Land-The Canadian Experience, 8 U.B.C. L.
REV. 35, 38 (1973). The right of the parties to modify their agreement during the
interval between the contract and conveyance of the deed. See Annotation, Merger of
Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.2D 1310, 1329 (1954); Snyder v. Roberts, 278 P.2d 348
(1955). Waiver and release of buyer's rights in the contract upon acceptance of deed.
See Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.21 1310, 1312 (1954).
21. The contract of sale being "Act I," and the closing document(s) (e.g., the
deed of conveyance) being "Act II."
22. The executory period being the "intermission;" i.e., the interval in between
the two acts.
23. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24. Sun First Nat'l Bank v. Grinnell, 416 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1982). The court explained that the contract has been "fulfilled and exhausted," and it
may have "historical, but no legal, significance." Id. at 834.
25. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 697 n.60 (Merger may be so evidently
unfair that a court may go to rather astonishing lengths to 'find' evidence that it was
not intended by the parties.).
1176 [Vol. 16
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refuse to enforce the antecedent contractual covenants. The early New
York case, Bull v. Willard,2 6 for example, acknowledged and confirmed
the merger rule, prima facie, but also recognized that "cases may arise
in which the deed would be regarded as only a part execution of the
contract," and that the "unexecuted" covenants must remain enforcea-
ble under exceptions to the rule.2 7
In theory, the exceptions fall into several categories:
1. Fraud, mistake or accident28
2. Contract provisions that are not necessarily performed by the
deed,2" such as
a. "Collateral" or "independent"covenants. 30
b. "Bifurcated" contract; "part performance. 31
c. Covenants that the parties "did not intend" to
merge. 2
3. Covenants that by their own terms inherently cannot be per-
formed until after the conveyance.3 3
26. Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
27. The Bull court then stated that it is "a nice and difficult question" to deter-
mine whether contract covenants are to be deemed executed or not; i.e., whether or not
to apply merger, and went on to establish several criteria (referred to hereafter in this
article as the "Bull criteria") to answer the question. The Bull criteria inquire whether
the covenant in question "looks to" or is "connected with" the title, possession, quan-
tity, or emblements of the land; if it is, the covenant is extinguished; if not, the cove-
nant may survive. Id. at 645. The Bull criteria are discussed further in the text accom-
panying notes 192-98 infra.
28. Rather than being exceptions to the rule, some courts and authors comment
that the rule is simply "not applicable" in these situations. E.g., MILTON R. FRIEDMAN.
CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 7.2, at 649 n.5 (3d ed. 1975).
29. See Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31, 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(Merger "'does not apply to those provisions ... which are not necessarily performed or
satisfied by the execution and delivery of the stipulated conveyance.").
30. See Graham v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 154 So. 335 (1934) (sustaining the
exception to the merger rule relating to independent covenants); see also Peterson v.
Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("Where an agreement is
collateral to, or independent of, the provisions of a deed, there is no merger.").
31. See Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (provi-
sions regarding consideration to be paid usually do not merge).
32. See Graham v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 154 So. 335 (1934) (exception ex-
ists to merger rule concerning provisions not intended to be in the deed).
33. See Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (cov-
enant to occupy premises could not be performed until after conveyance of the deed);
see also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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4. Covenants expressly provided to survive. 34
Further discussion of these exceptions appears in Parts V.B. and V.C.
of this article.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE IN FLORIDA
Discussion and approval of the doctrine of merger in the case law
of Florida is found as early as 1850, in the case of Hunter v. Brad-
ford.35 As in the several English and American cases of similar pe-
riod, 36 Hunter enunciated the principle of merger but did not denomi-
nate it as such. In Hunter, the purchaser of property prayed to enjoin
his seller from collecting sums due on the purchase money indebtedness
for the reason that seller's title was defective,3 7 contrary to the agree-
ment for sale. The court sustained purchaser's defense to the debt
(thereby giving life to the seller's contractual covenant to convey good
title), notwithstanding that purchaser was, and had been, in possession
of the property for several years under a "title bond" (described by the
court as a "mere equitable title," an agreement to convey at a future
date). 8 Key to this holding giving life to the original contract, was the
court's finding that no deed of conveyance had been made or accepted,
and that purchaser was in possession merely under the agreement to
convey, an executory contract. For-continued the court-had the deed
been given, the contract would have become executed, and the defense
of defective title contrary to the original contract would be of no avail
to the purchaser. That is, the covenant of title under the original con-
tract would be deemed extinguished and unenforceable. Thus, the
Court distinguished between an executory contract, found to be the
case here, and an executed contract, in which case the defense would
not be allowed and the purchaser would be relegated solely to remedies
based upon his deed. The court thus stated the doctrine of merger,
without calling it by that name:
34. See Gabel v. Simmons, 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930) (seller's covenant to refund
purchase price did not merge into the deed because it was independent and not in-
tended to merge).
35. 3 Fla. 269 (1850).
36. See supra notes 11, 12, 16 and accompanying text.
37. It is interesting to note that this earliest of Florida cases involved a matter of
title to the land, a topic of great importance as appears infra at note 65 and accompa-
nying text.
38. Hunter, 3 Fla. at 287.
1178 [Vol. 16
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Courts draw a distinction as to claims for equitable interposition
between contracts executed and executory contracts, a distinction,
we think, founded upon good sense and justice. "Where the pur-
chaser has taken a deed with covenant of general warranty, under
which he has entered, and remains in undisturbed possession of the
land conveyed to him, if there be no fraud in the transaction, he
cannot, before eviction, on the mere ground of defect of title, ob-
tain relief in equity, or have the contract rescinded, or restitution of
the purchase money. In such case, he must seek a remedy upon the
covenant of warranty in his deed." 9
Perhaps the first Florida case to speak of the merger doctrine by
name, and in substance adopt the general rule in the classic sense as
recited above,40 was the 1930 decision, Gabel v. Simmons,41 wherein
the court adopted not only the doctrine of merger, but also certain of
the major exceptions thereto. It seems that on August 25, 1925, the
Simmonses, as purchasers, entered into a contract with Gabel, as seller,
for the purchase of three lots for $30,000, payable $1500 on execution
of the contract, $6000 at closing, and the balance over a subsequent
period post-closing. The contract contained a "special provision" (de-
nominated as such by the court, repeatedly and-as we shall soon
see-with good reason) to the effect that "[i]f purchaser is dissatisfied
after 90 days from closing, all monies paid shall be returned with 10%
interest." '42 The sale was closed on August 28, 1925, by purchasers pay-
ing the $6000 due at closing, and by seller delivering the agreed-upon
closing document. Prior to the expiration of the ninety days, as well as
at the expiration of the ninety days, as well as within a reasonable time
after the expiration of the ninety days, purchasers verbally and in writ-
ing expressed to seller their dissatisfaction with their purchase and re-
quested (nay, demanded) return of the $7500 that they had paid. Seller
refused, and purchasers sued. Seller defended on the basis that the
above-quoted special provision in the contract providing for refund was
no longer enforceable because it merged into the closing document
which was silent regarding any refund rights (and therefore no cause of
action could arise from that document). The classic defense of merger!
As it turned out, seller was right on the rule, but wrong because of
39. Id. (citation omitted); see also Musselwhite v. Oleson, 53 So. 944 (Fla.
1910).
40. See supra note 6 and accompanying quotation.
41. 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930).
42. [d. at 777.
1992] 1179
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"exceptions" thereto.
The Florida Supreme Court first confirmed its approval of the ba-
sic merger by deed rule of law, citing to Williston on Contracts' 3 and
Paige on Contracts," and quoted with approval from the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court:
[t]he general rule is that preliminary agreements and understand-
ings relating to the sale of land become merged in the deed.""
The Florida Supreme Court then went on to hold that the merger rule
was not applicable to this contract clause in this case for several rea-
sons ("exceptions" to the rule):"6 The 90-day refund provision was an
independent covenant that the parties did not intend to be incorporated
into the closing document; delivery of the closing document was merely
part performance of the contract, was not delivered by seller or ac-
cepted by buyer as full performance of the contract, so the contract
remains binding as to its other provisions; and the closing document
does not cover the entire subject matter of the original contract.' 7 Ad-
ditionally, and perhaps the court's most important statement of ration-
ale when analyzing the holding in this case from the viewpoint of the
doctrine of merger in its classic sense, merger was held inapplicable
here to the special 90-day refund provision because that covenant "con-
stituted a special agreement which was not appropriate to be included
in the [closing document]. . . ."" In other words, merger is applicable
to contract provisions that are "appropriate" to be included in the clos-
ing document; but, merger should not be applicable to a provision that
is "not appropriate" to be included in the closing document. 49
Gabel was but one of four early 1930s Florida cases dealing with
the merger rule. 5° Graham,51 for example, followed Gabel, stating that
43. Id. at 778.
44. Id. (citing 4 PAIGE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 2568 (2nd ed. 1929)).
45. Id. (citing Caveny v. Curtis, 101 A. 853, 854 (Pa. 1917)).
46. Gabel, 129 So. at 778. The combined usage of several exceptions to the rule,
as in Gabel, is analyzed further infra note 123 and accompanying text.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Gabel court's theory runs parallel to the "Bull criteria" discussed
later in this article, which as will be seen constitutes substantial underpinning for deter-
mining those (limited) situations in which use of the merger rule is conceptually correct
(the "true merger" cases), namely where it would be appropriate for the closing docu-
ment to include the subject matter of the earlier contract.
50. The other three cases are: Graham, 154 So. 335 (Fla. 1934) (discussed infra
[Vol. 161180
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"[i]t is a general rule that preliminary agreements and understandings
relative to the sale of property usually merge in the deed and mortgage
by which the original contract becomes executed."6 The court then
again quoted with approval the very same statement from the Pennsyl-
vania supreme court 3 as was quoted in Gabel, but found the contrac-
tual provision sub judice (a covenant regarding subordination of the
purchase money mortgage to a construction loan mortgage) within sev-
eral of the exceptions to the rule, and therefore enforceable. 5
Thus, by the early 1930s the doctrine of merger (and several of its
exceptions) had become firmly ingrained in Florida case law. During
the next thirty years, however, the appellate courts in Florida were
called upon to visit the rule only once.55 Nevertheless, during the suc-
ceeding twenty-six-year period (from 1965 through current date), not
less than twenty-two Florida cases have dealt with the doctrine of
merger. 56 These latter cases, sometimes referred to in this article as the
"recent Florida cases," are summarized in the Appendix to this article
and are discussed and analyzed throughout the balance of this article.
Analysis of these recent Florida cases gives us pause to look closely at
the conceptual basis for the doctrine of merger as stated, for example,
in the early case of Bull v. Willard,57 and here we question whether the
recent cases are applying the correct doctrine. Thus, as the balance of
this article unfolds, we trace the more recent Florida case law and ap-
proach the headline of this article: Taking the Bull by the Horns.
at notes 51 through 54 and accompanying text); White v. Crandall, 143 So. 871, 879
(Fla. 1932) ("where the defendant has completed the purchase, accepted his deed, the
transaction is closed, and the purchaser is confined to his action for breach of the cove-
nant" contained in the deed); and Riddle v. Coliver, 156 So. 880 (Fla. 1934) (provision
in original agreement of sale that buyer would assume existing mortgage was not "de-
stroyed" by the fact that the deed of conveyance was only made "subject to" the
mortgage).
51. Graham, 154 So. at 337 (sustaining the exception to the merger rule, con-
cerning independent covenants and covenants not intended to be incorporated into the
deed and whose subject matter is not covered by the deed).
52. Id.
53. See Caveny v. Curtis, 101 A. 853 (Pa. 1917).
54. Graham, 154 So. at 337 (the covenant subordinated a purchase money mort-
gage to an anticipated construction loan first mortgage).
55. See Volunteer Sec. Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947).
56. See APPENDIX infra.
57. 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
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V. ANALYSIS OF RECENT FLORIDA CASES: ARE THE
EXCEPTIONS OVERTAKING THE RULE?
Of the twenty-two recent Florida cases dealing with the merger
doctrine during the period from 1965 through current date, eight ap-
plied the rule and refused to enforce the contract provision, two
augured applicability of the rule by dicta, while twelve cases found that
the subject contract provision fell within some exception to the rule and
was therefore still viable and enforceable. 8 Looking strictly at the last
decade, merger was applied twice (maybe twice more, by dicta), while
exceptions were found and the rule was rejected in ten cases.59 Are the
exceptions overtaking the rule? If so, why?
An attempt was made to categorize the decisions based upon. the
subject matter of the contractual provision. As seen in the Appendix,6"
this exercise proved worthwhile in certain respects,61 yet in other re-
spects the results were confusing and futile.62 The following sections of
this article discuss these decisions in the contexts of:
A) Analyzing the cases in which the merger rule was applied, and.
the contract provision was therefore held unenforceable;
B) Analyzing the cases that found exceptions to the merger rule,
declined to apply the rule, and thus allowed enforcement of the
antecedent contract;
C) Analyzing the cases which held that the merger rule was not
applicable due to mistake, fraud or accident, and therefore allowed
enforcement of the contract;
58. See APPENDIX infra.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. E.g., Stephan v. Brown, 233 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (dem-
onstrating a consistent application of the doctrine or of exceptions to the doctrine);
White v. Crandall, 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932) (same); see also Bennett v. Behring, 466 F.
Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (those covenants involving matters of "title" consistently
merge into the deed).
62. For example, several cases involved the same subject matter but the appellate
courts reached inconsistent results. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (provision for award of attorney's fees do not merge into deed); Stein-
berg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d. 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(seller's covenant regarding compliance with city codes does not merge into the deed).
But see Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (seller's
covenant against city code violations merged into deed); Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d
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D) Seeking to discern common threads as to why the merger rule
was or was not applied.
A. Merger Rule Applied; Contract Provision Unenforceable
1. Title Cases
2. Accord and Satisfaction Cases
The Florida case law has generally followed the majority view63
and the "trend" '64 in applying the merger rule to those cases involving
matters of title." This conclusion is not only in accord with the dictates
of Bull,66 but also certainly makes sense as a consequence of the "same
subject matter" rationale.67 For, where the subject matter of the con-
tract (here, a covenant concerning the quality of title) is the same sub-
ject matter as covered in the deed (typically, a Warranty Deed, war-
ranting the quality of title), then it makes perfect sense to hold that the
later instrument superseded the earlier with respect to that subject
matter, thereby extinguishing any further legal efficacy of the earlier
covenant. The difficulty arises, of course, in discerning what is a "mat-
ter of title."
Two fairly early Florida cases 8 dealt with restrictive covenants
["incumbrances" (sic) on the title, wrote the court]69 and in both cases
the merger rule was applied. In the first case, White v. Crandall,7 the
antecedent representation was alleged to have been that the land was
free from encumbrances. In fact, it was shown that several building
restrictions, race restrictions, and easements existed encumbering the
land, and it was further shown that the documentation of these burdens
63. Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed. 38 A.L.R. 2D 1310, 1327 (1954);
Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 84 A.L.R. 1008, 1024 (1932).
64. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 697-98 nn. 57, 61.
65. See Volunteer Sec. Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947); White v. Cran-
dall, 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932); Stephan v. Brown, 233 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1970) (covenants concerning matters of title usually merge into deed); St. Clair v.
City flank & Trust, 175 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
66. See infra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 190-91 and accompanying text.
68. See Volunteer Sec. Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947); White v. Cran-
dall, 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932).
69. White, 143 So. at 879.
70. 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932).
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upon the land was of public record when title was conveyed and ac-
cepted. The Court held that the antecedent representations of free and
clear title merged into the deed conveying this title, and were no longer
viable.7 The second fairly early case, Volunteer Security,72 involved
the opposite situation from White.7 Rather than a covenant against
encumbrances (as in White), the contract in Volunteer Security affirm-
atively contained the encumbrances to the land, which were residential,
building and race restrictions that the buyer of the property sought to
enforce. The deed to the subject property, however, was silent as to any
restrictions. The court again held the doctrine of merger to be applica-
ble, and ruled that the restrictions contained in the contract had
merged into the (silent) deed, and were therefore unenforceable. 74
Only one of the "more recent" 75 Florida cases dealt with restric-
tive covenants, and that was the Federal district court case, Bennett v.
Behring Corp. Similar to the accusation in White,77 the complaint in
Bennett was that restrictive covenants of record constituted a breach by
seller of its promise under the contract of purchase and sale to deliver
title free and clear of all encumbrances. The particular restriction on
title complained of in Bennett required all homeowners in a certain 31-
community development to become lessees under recreational facilities
leases and to pay rental fees thereunder. In a class action on behalf of
all homeowners, the plaintiffs contended that their seller (the defend-
ant-developer of the communities) breached its contract promise of
clear title by virtue of this encumbering restriction. The facts revealed,
however, that a reference to this restriction appeared on the face of all
of the deeds that were delivered to and accepted by the plaintiff-pur-
chasers. Accordingly, defendant-seller argued-and the court so
ruled-that any complaint that purchasers might have had for defec-
tive title contrary to the covenants of clear title as contained in their
contracts of purchase and sale, was barred by the doctrine of merger.
Those contract covenants respecting the quality of title merged away,
or more accurately merged into, the deeds by which the original con-
71. Id. at 871 (continuing: "The transaction became an executed contract of sale
of the land. The purchase was completed and the defendant accepted the title ....
(emphasis added).
72. 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947).
73. White, 143 So. 871 (Fla. 1932).
74. Volunteer, 33 So. 2d at 151.
75. The period from 1965 to date. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
76. 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
77. See White, 143 So. at 871.
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tracts became executed. The title covenants of the deeds controlled,
and since the deeds were expressly made subject to the restriction, no
action could lie thereunder for defective title. The Court went on to
espouse that:
The plaintiffs' remedy would have been to refuse to close, [to re-
fuse to] accept the deed, and sue on the contract. Failing this,
plaintiffs' sole remaining remedy is to sue for a breach of covenant
in the deed which is not possible since the exception to the cove-
nant is clearly stated.s
Continuing in the line of "title" cases, the only other recent Flor-
ida case involving a covenant against encumbrances on title was Ste-
phen v. Brown,79 where again the seller covenanted under the written
contract of sale that the conveyance of title would be free and clear of
all encumbrances. The deed delivered and accepted at closing con-
tained no covenant against encumbrances. Post-closing, purchaser
sought rescission alleging that the property was in sub-standard condi-
tion contrary to the city code, that this violation constituted an encum-
brance on title, and that seller knew of the violation (the "encum-
brance") prior to the closing. The trial court's dismissal of purchaser's
complaint was affirmed on appeal: The contractual covenant respecting
this matter of title was not actionable, it having merged into the (na-
ked) deed.
Another recognizable pattern in the Florida case law is adherence
to the merger rule in factual situations evidencing orthodox accord and
satisfaction. This pattern is clearly illustrated by a graphic analysis in
outline form of the following two recent Florida cases:80 In St. Clair,"
there was:
1. An agreement: Seller covenanted, in the contract of sale, to con-
vey by warranty deed.
2. A problem: During the executory period (between contract and
closing), it was discovered that title to a portion of the property (a
15-foot strip on one side) was not insurable.
78. Bennett, 466 F. Supp. at 701-02.
79. 233 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
80. See Uwanawich v. Gaudini, 334 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
St. Clair v. City Bank & Trust Co. of St. Petersburg, 175 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1965).
81. St. Clair, 175 So. 2d 791.
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3. A resolution: To resolve the problem, the seller offered and the
purchaser agreed to accept a quit-claim deed to the 15-foot strip.
4. An accord and satisfaction: In a subsequent action to foreclose
the purchase-money mortgage given in connection with the sale,
the purchaser-mortgagor raised as a defense that seller had failed
to fulfill his covenant to convey by warranty deed. Held, accord
and satisfaction; the obligation under the subject covenant had
been discharged "by merger. "82
In Uwanawich,83 there was:
1. An agreement: Buyer and seller agreed, in the contract of sale,
that the purchase-money mortgage would contain a thirty-day de-
fault clause.
2. A problem: During the executory period, a problem arose con-
cerning the seller's insistence that the purchase-money mortgage be
joined in execution by the buyer's wife (a non-signatory to the con-
tract of sale).
3. A resolution: To resolve the problem, the seller offered to accept
the mortgage without the wife's joinder if the thirty-day default
clause were reduced to a fifteen-day period. Buyer agreed and the
closing documents (deed and mortgage) were so executed and
delivered.
4. An accord and satisfaction: In a subsequent action to foreclose
the purchase-money mortgage, the buyer-mortgagor attempted to
invoke defensive relief under the contracted-for 30-day default
clause. Held, accord and satisfaction; that agreement had been dis-
charged "by merger.""
A variety of particular contractual covenants were involved in the
several other recent Florida cases examined in which the doctrine of
merger was applied. The various types of covenants under adjudication
included an attorney's fee provision,B a representation against code vio-
82. Id. at 792. On point is Corbin's commentary:
If the contract of sale required the vendor to convey a perfect title by a
warranty deed and the purchaser later accepts a quit claim deed as full
performance, he can not enforce the original contract that required more.
If this is correct, it should be described as a discharge by accord and satis-
faction or substituted contract and not by "merger."
6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1319, at 310-12 (1962).
83. Uwanawich v. Gaudini, 334 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
84. Id. at 118.
85. See Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984); see
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lations, 86 conditions for releasing property from a purchase-money
mortgage, 87 and terms of payment for a business located on (but pay-
ment not directly secured by) associated real property;88 and in each of
these cases, the antecedent contractual covenant was held unenforce-
able because of the merger rule. Additionally, dicta in one very recent
case 811 indicated that although the court did not have to reach this is-
sue, merger would have applied and the court would have refused to
enforce the contract condition discussed there (a warranty against vio-
lation of governmental regulations as of closing) had the plaintiffs' case
not fallen for other reasons.90 However, contrary to the consistency
heretofore noted in the application of the rule to cases involving mat-
ters of title9 and cases involving obvious accord and satisfaction,92 no
pattern or generalized rule of law can be gleaned from this latter group
of miscellaneous Florida cases9" that all applied the merger doctrine.
B. Exceptions to the Merger Rule; Contract Enforced
Continuing our review of the recent Florida cases, we now proceed
to analyze those in which the court declined to apply the merger rule,
and accordingly enforced the provision of the original contract of
purchase and sale on the basis that the particular contract covenant fell
within an exception to the rule under the facts and circumstances sub
judice. A side-by-side analysis of two recent cases, Fraser" and
also infra note 141 and accompanying text.
86. See Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); see
also infra note 93 and accompanying text.
87. See Sun First National Bank of Orlando v. Grinnell, 416 So. 2d 829, 834
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (the contract for sale was "fully performed when . . .
closed." "Such a fulfilled and exhausted contract has historical, but no legal, signifi-
cance .... ").
88. See Soper v. Stine, 184 So. 2d 892, 894 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (A
preliminary agreement for the sale of the business merged into the deed. The prelimi-
nary agreement was not "outside, collateral to, or independent of" the deed.).
89. Field v. Perry, 564 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
90. Id. at 509-10 (court's decision of reversal was grounded on the lack of sub-
stantial evidence of the violation of governmental regulations). Consequently, the
court's commentary that the cause of action "was dismissible," for merger reasons was
dicta. Id. at 506 n.3.
91. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
94. Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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Opler,95 both decided by the same court9" and within three years of
each other, demonstrates quite similar fact patterns, with conflicting
results--one applied the rule and refused enforcement of the contract;
the other found an exception to the rule and allowed enforcement of
the contract covenant. This apparent clash may best be illustrated by
comparing the two cases in outline form: In Fraser:97
1. Contract provision: "8. Seller further states that there are no
code violations of the City of Miami Beach or the County of
Dade."
2. Facts: Buyer knew, before closing, that there existed in the prop-
erty violations of city building and zoning regulations.
3. Buyer closed.
4. Court held: Buyer could not recover for breach of the above-
quoted provision. Buyer was precluded by the doctrine of merger.
The contract provision merged into the deed.
In Opler:98
1. Contract provision: "F: Ingress and Egress: Seller covenants and
warrants that there is ingress and egress to said property."
2. Facts: Buyer knew, before closing, that the property was without
ingress and egress.
3. Buyer closed.
4. Court held: Buyer was entitled to recover for breach of the
above-quoted contract provision. Buyer was protected by an excep-
tion to the merger rule. The contract provision did not merge into
the deed.
An attempt to distinguish these two cases from each other provides
a springboard to scrutinize various exceptions to the merger rule
(which exceptions are not mutually exclusive, but in many cases over-
lap with each other). Both cases first acknowledged, confirmed, and re-
stated the basic doctrine that as a general rule, all preliminary agree-
ments and understandings relative to the sale of property usually merge
95. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied,
412 So. 2d 472 (1982).
96. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal.
97. 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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into the deed of conveyance executed pursuant thereto.99 And each de-
cision then went on to consider and dispose of certain of the recognized
exceptions to the rule. Succinctly stated, Fraser considered but rejected
the "no intent to merge" exception and the "not necessarily performed
by the deed" exception, while Opler sustained the "collateral" or "inde-
pendeni" covenant exception. Perhaps the distinction between the hold-
ings in these two cases, although not specifically so analyzed or dis-
cussed in either opinion, stems directly from the inherent fact that in
Fraser the covenant against code violations was a representation con-
cerning the condition of the property itself (a covenant on the prop-
erty), while the access covenant in Opler dealt with a condition not
involving the deeded property per se but the availability of ingress and
egress over lands outside the boundaries of the deeded property (a cov-
enant off the property). In other words, consistent with the postulate
developed later in this article regarding "true merger"100 and the cru-
cial common law requirement thereof that the subject matter of the
contract must be one that is fundamental to or inherent in the land in
question, 01 it can well be argued that the access covenant pertained to
terra firma other than the land under contract and hence the doctrine
of merger is out of the question.
The "no intent to merge" exception was stated by the court in
Milu as follows: "The rule (of merger) . ..does not apply to those
provisions of the antecedent contract which the parties do not intend to
be incorporated in the deed . .. "102 The "no intent" exception is often
combined with one or more of the other exceptions to the rule. Thus, in
Milu,10 3 where the seller's complaint against his buyer for payment of
the balance of the sales price (which, per the contract was to be certain
shares of stock) was based on the original contract of sale, and the
buyer defended on the basis that the contract was no longer a viable
instrument on which to base a cause of action because the sale was
closed and a deed was delivered to and accepted by the buyer, the court
invoked both the "no intent to merge" exception and the "not necessa-
rily performed by the deed" exception' in sustaining the complaint
99. Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 534; Opler, 402 So. 2d at 1311.
100. See infra notes 202-07 and accompanying text; see also Bull v. Willard, 9
Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
101. See infra notes 192-98 and accompanying text; see also Bull, 9 Barb. 641.
102. Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31,33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
103. Id.
104. The merger rule does not apply to contract provisions "which are not neces-
sarily performed or satisfied by the execution and delivery of the stipulated convey-
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and holding that the contract provision promising payment ("considera-
tion") was still enforceable:10 5 The same conclusion has been reached
by the appellate courts of numerous other states, to the extent that it
may be said that there is a general exception to the merger rule that
permits enforcement of contract provisions relating to payment of con-
sideration notwithstanding delivery and acceptance of the deed. 0 6 The
reason for this generally recognized exception has been stated that in
practice deeds of conveyance do not usually recite the consideration
with particularity or accuracy10 7 (rather, a typical recitation of consid-
eration is often "Ten dollars and Other Good and Valuable Considera-
tion"), and thus it cannot 'be concluded that the parties intended to
fulfill the earlier consideration covenant by passage of the deed. It
would seem, however, that the issue of whether the consideration cove-
nant was or was not fully performed by passage of the deed, is an evi-
dentiary question in the realm of accord and satisfaction rather than
merger, a point developed further in Part VI of this article.108
The "no intent to merge" exception, combined with the "not nec-
essarily performed by the conveyance" exception, also formed the basis
of the court's decision in Sager v. Turner.109 Relying strongly on
Milu, 10 the plaintiff-buyer in Sager.was allowed to recover against his
seller for breach of seller's contract covenants that 1) buyer would be
able to obtain all necessary permits and licenses to operate the property
(a mobile home park), and 2) there existed no violations of any li-
censes, permits, local ordinances, restrictions or easements, notwith-
standing the seller's arguments of merger. "1 ' Although at first blush the
covenant against violations in Sager appears most identical with that in
Fraser" ' and precedent within the same appellate district would be
compelling of a merger holding, closer scrutiny reveals factual distinc-
ance." Id.
105. "Contractual provisions as to considerations to be paid by the purchaser are
ordinarily not merged in the deed .... " Id. (emphasis added).
106. See Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.2D 1310, 1334
(1954) (The deed is not conclusive as to the amount of consideration.).
107. Id.
108. "Merger" has become just a buzzword; "Accord and Satisfaction" is the
more appropriate doctrine in most cases. See infra Part VI.
109. 402 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
110. Milu, Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
111. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283.
112. Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 533.
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tions in these two cases. In Fraser, it is recalled,1 13 the buyer closed
with knowledge of and in the face of existing building and zoning viola-
tions, and no recovery was allowed under buyer's subsequent action for
breach of the contract of sale covenant against such violations, because
of the doctrine of merger. In Sager, however, as the court pointed out,
there was no evidence that this buyer knew of any violations pre-clos-
ing, and furthermore the contract covenant sued upon contemplated
that buyers would obtain all necessary operational licenses and permits,
obviously an act that could not take place until after closing' 14 and
which was dependent on there being no ordinance violations. Hence,
the court extracted the buyers in Sager from the fatal consequence of
the merger rule by the "no intent to merge" exception and by the addi-
tional exception that the breached contractual covenant was "not nec-
essarily performed or satisfied by the execution and delivery of the stip-
ulated conveyance. ' '1
5
The "collateral covenant" or "independent covenant" exception,
relied on in Opler" 0 and other recent Florida cases,1 7 had its Florida
genesis as the basis for the court declining to apply merger in the early
1930s cases of Gabel' 8 and Graham."9 The statement of the exception
is rather straightforward: "Where an agreement is collateral to, or in-
dependent of, the provisions of the deed, there is no merger,"'2 0 Never-
theless, the theory behind this exception is really intertwined with the
"no intent to merge" and the "not necessarily performed by the deed"
113. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
114. See Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283.
115. The Sager court took great pains to distinguish its holding from Fraser.
Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283. It was the Sager court's holding that the language "plainly
survived the closing" because they contemplated an action (obtaining all necessary per-
mits and licenses) to be taken by buyer after the closing. Id. The "action after closing"
exception is discussed further infra notes 135-38 and accompanying text. See also
Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (no merger found and contract provisions enforced for city code violation con-
trary to seller's representation as to quantity of units allowable in apartment building).
116. Opler, 402 So. 2d at 1311.
117. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Ameri-
can Nat'l Self Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar, 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
118. See Gabel v. Simmons, 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930).
119. See Graham v. Commonwealth Life Ins., 154 So. 335 (Fla. 1934).
120. Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672, 673 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(separate agreement made to quit claim the property back to transferor if transferee
ceased living on the property).
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exceptions. These exceptions are akin to each other in that they all go
to the heart of the merger rule in recognizing that for there to be a
discharge of the antecedent covenant, the parties must have knowingly
done so or the circumstances must be such that knowledge of the conse-
quences of their action is imputed to them; and if such knowledge (or
imputed knowledge) is absent, then the contract covenant will be saved
by an exception to the rule.
For example, the contract covenant sought to be enforced by the
buyer of the property in Gabel,121 we recall, 12 2 was seller's promise that
"[i]f purchaser is dissatisfied after 90 days from closing, all monies
paid shall be returned with 10% interest." In denying seller's defense
that the promise was unenforceable due to merger, the court relied
upon a combination of several of the exceptions to the rule in order to
sustain the life of the subject contract covenant:1 23
1. The covenant was "independent;" it "constituted a special agree-
ment which was not appropriate to be included" in the closing doc-
ument. Therefore, the covenant survived.
2. The covenant was "not intended" by the parties to be incorpo-
rated in the closing document. Therefore, it survived.
3. The delivery of the conveyance was merely "part performance of
the contract, which remains binding as to its further provisions."
Therefore, the subject promise survived.
4. The closing document did not "cover the entire subject-matter
contracted for." Therefore, this promise-being subject-matter not
covered by the closing-survived.
The theory thus was emerging, later confirmed by Graham,1 24 that
for the doctrine of merger to operate, the subject matter of the contract
provision that is claimed to be unenforceable must be the same subject
matter as was encompassed within (or, as is typically deemed included
in) the document delivered and accepted at closing. When that paral-
lelism exists, it may be said that the liabilities under the contract have
been "discharged by merger;"12 5 absent that parallelism, the covenant
may be said to be one which is "outside of, collateral to, or independent
of the provisions of the deed; [and] they survive delivery and accept-
121. 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930).
122. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
123. Gabel, 129 So. at 777-78.
124. 154 So. at 337-38.
125. See 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 310-12 (1962).
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ance of the deed of conveyance and remain enforceable."" 6
In pursuance of this line of reasoning, seller's contract representa-
tion and warranty that sufficient water, sewer and electric service ca-
pacity was available at the property site was clearly seen by the court
as an enforceable "collateral agreement" in American National Self
Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar,127 the court explained:
The continued efficacy, then, of collateral agreements which are
not usually included in the terms of a deed is not affected by the
merger rule [citing Milu and Soper]. Such collateral agreements
call for acts by the seller which go beyond merely conveying clear
title and placing the purchaser in possession of the property. 12 8
Several general types of contract clauses have become stereotyped
as "collateral" or "independent," and thus generally speaking are
deemed exceptions to the merger rule almost as a matter of course,
without the courts affording much discussion or analysis in the more
recent individual cases.12 One such type of clause, the seller's warranty
concerning availability of water, sewer or other utilities, has already
been examined.'3 0 Another stereotyped group of clauses, closely akin to
the foregoing, is seller's representation about the nature or condition of
the property, such as: "Seller warrants air conditioning and heating
systems, . . . to be in working order at the time of closing."'' 1 Holding
that this warranty did survive the closing, the court observed: "Our
research reveals that the warranty in this case is the type of indepen-
dent covenant generally excepted from the merger doctrine."' 32 The
court's prescient 1980 general observation in Campbell'" has gained
126. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (seller
covenants ingress and egress to the property), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 472 (1982).
127. 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
128. Id. at 305; see also In re Wildflower Landholding, 49 Bankr. 246 (M.D.
Fla. 1985) (rejecting a claim of merger respecting seller's contract covenants to make
water and sewer services available to the property site (as well as additional covenants
by seller to grant free golf and tennis club membership and to build a road) on the
basis of the "no intent to merge" exception).
129. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (attor-
ney's fee provision falls within the collateral agreement exception).
130. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
131. Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744, 745 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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virtually universal acceptance in the past ten years.""
A natural by-product of the several exceptions already discussed
("no intent to merge," "not necessarily performed by the deed,"
"merely part performance," "bifurcation," "collateral" or "indepen-
dent" covenant, and "not the same subject matter"), is the "action af-
ter closing" exception. It would seem only logical that where a party
was without the legal power, capacity or ability to perform a contractu-
ally required act until after the closing, then inherent in that contract
is not only the parties' intent but a mandatory legal conclusion that the
covenant survives the closing. This was part of the court's reasoning, we
recall, in Sager,35 where the contract covenants sought to be enforced
contemplated post-closing action (obtaining operating permits and li-
censes in a violation-free property), and thus it was the court's holding
that the covenants must be deemed to survive closing, must be enforce-
able or else the parties' obvious intent could not be fulfilled.
This "action after closing" exception also formed the basis for al-
lowing enforcement of the antecedent contract covenant in Peterson,36
where the covenant sought to be enforced was grantee's promise to re-
convey the residence to grantor (grantee's brother) if grantee should
ever cease to occupy the property. In striking down grantee's defense
that his contract covenant to reconvey was no longer enforceable be-
cause it had merged into the deed, the court noted:
Here the agreement by its very terms reflects the intent of the par-
ties that it be independent of the deed [citation omitted]. More-
over, the agreement, again by its very terms, could not become ef-
fective until after the delivery of the deed, since prior to that time
Jack would have no life estate to forfeit by ceasing to occupy the
property.137
The conclusion was obvious, therefore, that a covenant that could not
possibly be performed until after delivery of the deed, must be "collat-
eral to" and "independent of" that deed; and so held the two out-of-
134. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Durden
v. Century 21 Compass Points, 541 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Ameri-
can Nat'l Self Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar, 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Sager v. Turner, 402
So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
135. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
136. See Peterson v. Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
137. Id. at 673 (emphasis added).
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state cases' 38 cited in Peterson in support of this proposition.
Another stereotypical clause has produced conflicting results and
confusing analysis in the recent case law of Florida, and that is the
"prevailing party attorney's fees" clause.' 39 The conflict and confusion
concerning the applicability of the doctrine of merger to this type of
clause is glaring, as illustrated by comparing the holdings in following
five cases, In each of these cases, an attorney's fee provision was con-
tained solely in the particular contract of sale, and in each case en-
forcement of the contract clause was sought after the transaction had
closed and the deed had changed hands. The holding in each of these
cases was as follows:
1. Campbell:"" Attorney's fees properly awarded to the prevailing
party. No merger.
2. Gordon:"' Prevailing party not entitled to attorney's fees, be-
cause that contractual provision merged into the deed.
3. Fleischer: 2 Attorney's fees denied on other grounds (namely,
that the action was in tort, not "arising out of this contract"); how-
ever, substantial dicta approving and reaffirming the denial of at-
torney's fees in Gordon, based upon merger.
4. Burkett:r '" Prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees. No
merger.
5. Field:1 4 Prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees, the
amount to be determined on remand. No merger.
138. The cited cases were: Industrial Development Foundation v. United States
Hoffman Machinery Corp., 171 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1958) (agreement forfeiting life estate
is not effective until after delivery of deed because there is no life estate to forfeit until
delivery); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Wabash Randolph Corp., 51 N.E.2d 1'32 (I11.
1943) (agreement creating easement is not valid until deed is delivered).
139. The contract clause provided for the payment of attorney's fees:
Attorney fees and costs: In connection with any litigation arising out of
this contract, the prevailing party whether Buyer, Seller or Broker, shall
be entitled to recover all costs incurred including reasonable attorney's fees
for services rendered in connection with such litigation including appellate
proceedings and post judgment proceedings.
Fleischer v. Hi-Rise Homes Inc., 536 So. 2d 1105-06 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
140. Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
141. Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
142. Fleischer v. Hi Rise Homes Inc., 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
143. Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480, 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("[T]his
contract provision is not merged into the warranty deed.").
144. Field v. Perry, 564 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
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Part of the confusion in the cases involving attorney's fee provi-
sions stems from the fact that in some of the cases the courts focus on
the contract's attorney's fee provision itself in determining the merger
issue, while in other cases the courts consider the attorney's fee clause
an appendage of the primary contractual provision that formed the gra-
vamen of the action or the defense to the action in answering whether
or not merger should apply. 1" Nevertheless, even with the recognition
of this dichotomy, there is still no consistency in the holdings, as illus-
trated by the five cases outlined above. Based upon the criteria ap-
proved in Fleischer"' (the "Bull criteria" as hereinafter discussed), 47
it would seem that a sterile prevailing party attorney's fee provision,
standing by itself, would be "collateral" and would not merge, since it
does not involve title, possession, quantity, or emblements of the land.
However, if the life of the attorney's fees provision is dependent upon
the survival of the substantive contractual provision on which the action
or defense was based,148 then the attorney's fee provision must be
viewed as "a bird riding on a wagon, "149 so that the substantive provi-
sion must first be subjected to the Bull test, and then "as goes the
substantive provision, so goes the attorney's fees." 150
C. Mistake, Accident, Fraud; Contract Enforceable
It has been said that "[tihe execution and acceptance of the deed
does not affect the rights of the purchaser to relief against the vendor
on the ground of fraud or mistake, if the purchaser was laboring under
its influence at the time of his acceptance of the deed."1 51
145. See Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
146. 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
147. Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641, 645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850). See infra notes
192-98 and accompanying text. The four Bull criteria cited in Fleischer are title, pos-
session, quantity, and emblements. Fleischer, 536 So. 2d at 1107.
148. For example, when the attorney's fee provision is "piggy-backed" onto the
substantive provision, as the court seemed to imply in Gordon. See Fleischer v. Hi-Rise
Homes Inc., 536 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (as to "possession").
149. This metaphor was used by Professor Powell to descriptively analogize a
covenant that runs with the land. See 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 670.2 (rev. ed. 1986).
150. "As goes Maine, so goes the nation." JOHN BARTLETT. BARTLETT'S FAMIL-
IAR QUOTATIONS 1101(a) (14th ed. 1968).
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Thus, in two of the recent Florida cases,' the injured parties
were able to avert the deadly decree of the merger rule by relying on
the excuse of mistake. And it is significant to note that the contractual
subject matters that thus survived passage of the deeds in these two
cases involved 1) the title to the property, and 2) the quantity of land
conveyed, which are both bastions of merger edict under the "Bull cri-
teria"'' 53 and under recognized general rules, as developed elsewhere in
this article. 154
In Southpointe,5 5 the first of these cases, the contract of sale pro-
vided for seller to sell to buyer the "Sunrise Golf Course Club House,
cart sheds, and maintenance sheds.' 56 After the closing of the sale, the
buyer discovered that the deed of conveyance failed to include the
maintenance shed property. Buyer sued seller for breach of its contract
covenant to convey that (maintenance shed) property. Viewed in the
language of Bull, the gravamen of buyer's cause of action was that
there was; a shortage in the quantity and title of the land actually con-
veyed versus the quantity and title of land that the seller had con-
tracted to convey. Seller defended on the basis of merger, and seem-
ingly he could not have been more correct in light of Bull and the long
line of cases following Bull.' 7 However, the buyer was saved from
merger mortality by the court's finding that the omission of the mainte-
nance shed property from the deed may well have been caused by a
mistake (a factual issue to be determined on remand); and if in fact the
omission was by mistake then the doctrine of merger would not apply.
The court quoted Corbin'58 with approval:
This doctrine of merger by deed does not purport to apply primar-
ily to cases of mistake, whether as to title or as to other facts ....
If the case is one in which there was a real mistake as to title, or as
to some fact on which title depends, and is a case in which the
grantee did not intend to assume the risks of failure of title, there
152. Southpointe Dev., Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
153. See infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
155. Southpointe Dev., Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986).
156. hi. at 1362.
157. See infra notes 195-98 (Merger operates automatically without parallel cov-
enants in contract and deed in matters of 1) title, 2) possession, 3) quantity, and 4)
emblements).
158. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 604 (1960).
19921 1197
27
Ginsburg: The Doctrine of Merger With Respect to Real Estate Transactions:
Published by NSUWorks, 1992
Nova Law Review
is now no good reason for refusing the appropriate form of relief
that would be given in other mistake cases. "
Title and the quantum of estate conveyed were the subjects at is-
sue in Kidd, 6 ' the other recent Florida case in which the plaintiff suc-
cessfully invoked mistake as his excuse to the otherwise fateful blow of
merger. In most of the merger cases, we have observed,"' the com-
plainant is the buyer who post-closing discovers a situation that is con-
trary to the representations or warranties of seller under the contract of
sale. In Kidd, however, the injured party was the seller of an apartment
building who had reserved to himself, in the contract, a right to occupy
one of the apartments rent-free for the rest of his life. The deed exe-
cuted at closing, however, which had been prepared by a closing agent,
failed to reserve the life estate. The issue arose when seller, having
lived in the apartment rent-free for thirteen months, was evicted at the
behest of his buyer, and the court below found that no life estate ex-
isted because the covenant providing for it was contained only in the
agreement of purchase and sale which had been extinguished by
merger. The appellate court reversed, however, holding that seller's
conveyance at closing of a quantum of estate larger than had been con-
tracted for was a mistake, and
[w]hile the doctrine (of merger) is a viable one, we will not apply it
where a mistake has clearly been made and equity demands refor-
mation . . . . We choose to find a mutual mistake which permits
the reformation of the deed so as to make it express the real agree-
ment and intention of the parties.162
Situations involving fraud or mistake are most often not labeled by
the courts as "exceptions" to the merger rule; rather, it is said that the
doctrine of merger simply "does not apply" to these situations. 63 Thus,
159. Southpointe, 484 So. 2d at 1362-63.
160. Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
161. See APPENDIX infra.
162. Kidd, 498 So. 2d at 970.
163. See Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969, 970 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Southpointe Development Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 604 (1960); MILTON R.
FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 7.2, at 649; CUN-
NINGHAM, supra note 4, at 697 n.59. "[Merger] is said to be inapplicable to cases of
fraud or mistake." Pryor v. Aviola, 301 A.2d 306, 309 (Del. 1973). The reason for the
rule (that merger is inapplicable in cases of fraud) could not have been more aptly
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it would seem that the real art to survival of the injured party's claim
in these cases involves the characterization of the facts. The very same
factual situation may be characterized to appear as 1) pre-closing
fraud or mistake, in which case the merger rule simply "does not ap-
ply;" or 2) guiltless pre-closing activity, in which case the injured party
searches (sometimes with success; other times not) post-closing for an
"exception" to the rule. For example, why was it that (what turned out
to be) an erroneous statement by a seller concerning ingress and
egress,16 ' or the absence of municipal code violations, 65 was actionable
by the purchaser as an exception to the merger rule in each of those
cases, 166 while (what turned out to be) an erroneous statement concern-
ing the nature of a tenant's tenancy1 67 was there actionable by the pur-
chaser as fraud or misrepresentation?1 68 We could suggest an intellec-
tual answer to this question based upon scienter; i.e., whether the
perpetrator knew or should have known pre-closing of the false or erro-
neous facts or circumstances.' Another answer, intellectually unsatis-
stated than: "A contrary rule would work the absurd result of a fraudulent vendor
being insulated from legal liability by his very success in obtaining consummation of
the sale." Id.
164. Opler v. Wynne, 402 So. 2d Fla. 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev.
denied, 412 So. 2d 472 (1982) (the contractual covenant warranting ingress and egress
to the land is collateral or independent of the deed).
165, Sager v. Turner, 402 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (seller's
warranty against code violations did not merge into the deed because it was not in-
tended to merge and it is not necessarily fulfilled or satisfied by the conveyance).
166. Opler, 402 So. 2d at 1311; Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283.
167. See Durden v. Century 21 Compass Points, 541 So. 2d 1264 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1989) (seller's representation that the tenants in possession at the time of
contract were on a month to month lease was independent of the contract and "not the
type that merges in a deed").
168. See id. at 1266 (A seller's (mis)representations "are not the type that
merge in a deed at closing . . . because clearly they would be of no value or legal effect
unless they did survive the closing and acceptance of deed which act they were given to
induce.") (emphasis added).
169. See, e.g., Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (The merger doctrine was held applicable to preclude recovery where plaintiff
admittedly knew of code violations existent in the property before closing and neverthe-
less closed in face of them. The court took pains to point out however that this was a
case for breach of contract and not an action for fraud, thereby indicating that if it
were sounding in fraud then merger would be inapplicable); see also Sager v. Turner,
402 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (court emphasized the absence of any
pre-closing knowledge by plaintiff of the code violations, and sustained the plaintiff's
right to recover under an exception to the doctrine of merger).
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fying, was suggested by the court in Steinberg,170 that it really doesn't
matter whether the plaintiff's cause of action is grounded in fraud, mis-
take or breach of contract; the merger defense simply will not be avail-
able where seller's written representations later turn out to be
erroneous.
17 1
D. Why Was the Merger Rule Applied, or Not Applied; An
Attempt at Pigeon-holing
Having traced the history of the merger rule from English com-
mon law, having looked at the reasons for the rule from its origination,
having noted the adoption and development of the rule and its excep-
tions in early Florida case law, and having exposed some confusion and
inconsistencies in recent Florida case law regarding applicability of the
rule, we now address the perplexing question of why was the rule either
applied or not applied in these various cases?1"
One hypothesis in attempting to answer this question might be
that the type of contractual clause involved dictates whether or not the
merger rule should be applied. In pursuance of this hypothesis, all of
the Florida cases since 1930 were chronologically charted and notated
by 1) the nature of the contract clause involved, and 2) whether merger
or not the merger rule was applied.1 73 This exercise revealed that:
1. Merger applied in all of the title cases. 7"
170. Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978) (holding, without stated rationale or analysis, that a complaint brought
after closing and after discovery that apartment building could legally house only ten
tenants under city code, and not twenty-three tenants as represented in contract, does
state a cause of action either in fraud, or mistake, or for breach of contract representa-
tion, notwithstanding the defense of merger by acceptance of deed).
171. Of course, the conclusory holding in Steinberg allowing the cause of action
is an intellectual void, and causes us to wonder why the opposite result was reached in
Stephan v. Brown, where merger did apply to sustain the dismissal of plaintiff's com-
plaint in a cause of action for breach of contract due to violation of city code provi-
sions, where notification of such violations had been given to seller prior to closing. 233
So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
172. Perhaps the more worthwhile question is: Why should the rule either be
applied or not be applied in future cases? And even more thought provoking is the
query: Is the merger rule the "right" rule for analysis and adjudication of these types
of cases? These questions are addressed infra in part VI of this article.
173. See APPENDIX infra.
174. Id. (numbers two, five, nine, and thirteen).
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2. Merger applied in the obvious (!!??) accord and satisfaction fact
patterns."7 5
3. Merger did not apply to covenants regarding the physical condi-
tion of the property; those clauses survived.17 6
4. Merger did not apply to covenants that (inherently) were to be
performed post-closing; those covenants survived.' 77
5. Merger did not apply to covenants involving payment of consid-
eration; those covenants survived. 78
6. Merger did not apply to covenants concerning the priority status
of mortgages; those covenants survived.1'7
7. The Florida decisions'80 appear to be following the national
trends' 8' with respect to the subject matter of the several different
clauses summarized in paragraphs 1 through 6, above.
8. There is no consistency in the cases involving covenants against
code violations.' 82
9. There is no consistency in the cases involving attorneys fee
provisions. 83
The: problem with attempting to divide the cases into neat piles of
175. Id. (numbers six and ten).
176. Id. (numbers 14, 20, and 23).
177. Id. (numbers one, eight, and eighteen).
178. See APPENDIX infra (number eight); see also Annotation, Merger of Con-
tract in Deed, 38 A.L.R.2D 1310 (1954).
179. See APPENDIX infra (numbers three and four).
180. See supra notes 174-79.
181. As to the national trend respecting "title" cases, see CUNNINGHAM, supra
note 4, at 597 ("[Merger] is now largely limited to title provisions of the contract.").
See also Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R. 2D 1310 (1954) (cove-
nants regarding matters of title usually merge into the deed). As to the national trend
respecting "merger and accord and satisfaction," see 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS (1962). As to the national trend respecting the subject of "physical condi-
tion of the property," see Annotation, Defective Home-Vendor's Liability, 25 A.L.R.3D
383, 432 (1968) ("[Elxecutory covenants collateral to the passing of title do not merge
in a deed."). See also Annotation, Merger of Contract in Deed, 38 A.L.R. 2d 1310,
1325 (1954) ([It is generally held ...that provisions to make improvements or re-
pairs; although not incorporated in the deed are collateral thereto and survive it."). As
to the national trend respecting "post closing covenants," see Wiley v. Berg, 578 P.2d
384 (Or. .978) (those covenants to be performed post closing survive merger). As to
the national trend respecting "priority of a mortgage," see Snyder v. Roberts, 278 P.2d
348 (Wash. 1955) (covenants concerning the priority of mortgages usually do not
merge into the deed); Annotation, Vendee's Obligation-Deed-Merger, 52 A.L.R.2D
647 (1955).
182. See APPENDIX infra (numbers nine, eleven, and twelve).
183. Id. (numbers 19, 24, 26, and 27).
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1) "yes, merged," or 2) "no merger," based upon the type of contrac-
tual clause involved, is that the decisions in these cases generally do not
rise or fall strictly on the clause, itself; so many other facts and circum-
stances bombard the court. So, while it would be convenient and or-
derly to pigeon-hole the various types of contract clauses so that deter-
mination of survival is simply a function of checking our master list to
see whether the subject clause falls in the "merged" or the "no
merger" column (and, in fact, certain types of clauses do lend them-
selves to such easy disposition), 184 the vast majority of the cases involve
more complicated circumstances to the extent that the ultimate deci-
sion really turns on rationale other than the merger rule per se (al-
though merger is cited by the court to substantiate its conclusion).186 In
other words, either applying merger or an exception to merger becomes
the justification for the court's result-oriented decision, a determination
reached on other grounds. Thus, the consistencies revealed by a sterile
survey of the recent Florida cases,"" and the conformity of the Florida
cases to "national trends, ' 1 87 is simply fortuitous with respect to docu-
menting patterns or general rules in the applicability of the merger
doctrine, because the preponderance of cases are not "true merger"
cases at all but instead involve some form of accord and satisfaction.
VI. "MERGER" HAS BECOME JUST A BUZZWORD; "ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION" IS THE MORE APPROPRIATE DOCTRINE IN
MOST CASES
The notion of applying the doctrine of merger to terminate obliga-
tions arising under real estate contracts developed, we recall, from the
184. The "Title" cases.
185. See the discussion of Opler, supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text, as
a case in point. In Opler a buyer's action for breach of the contract covenant of access
was sustained, the court holding that "[tihe buyer's acceptance of the seller's deed as
well as his acquiescence to the remainder of seller's performance did not constitute a
merger because the seller's covenant expressly warranted that there was ingress and
egress to the land." 402 So. 2d at 1311 (emphasis added). This circuitous statement
not only begs the question of merger, but sidesteps the true issue of the case, whether
the parties intended that the covenant be released at closing. The court in essence re-
solved that issue in the negative, by allowing the contract action under the guise of
several recognized exceptions to the merger rule.
186. See, e.g., APPENDIX infra.
187. See supra note 181.
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common law precepts involving the merger of estates. 88 It is the thesis
of this section of this article that although the theory is doctrinally cor-
rect and although the application of the theory in the early cases was
correct, its employment in more recent years-both affirmatively, as
well as negatively (through the growth of "exceptions" to the
rule)-has deviated so far from the basic tenets of the merger doctrine
that its use in current cases is for name recognition value only, and its
true analytical worth has been bastardized. Furthermore, this article
postulates that the theoretically correct doctrine applicable in most of
these cases today is that of accord and satisfaction.
Applying the strict tenets of the common law doctrine of merger to
the real estate transaction, the theory maintains that the conveyance of
legal title at closing (such title being the "greater estate" as expressed
in the classic common law statement of the doctrine) absorbs, annihi-
lates and extinguishes the equitable title and rights under contract of
sale (the "lesser estate"). 189 Since the tenets of the common law doc-
trine of merger further dictate that merger shall occur only when the
two estates coincide in one and the same person, at one and the same
time, in one and the same right, and for one and the same purpose, 90
then a fortiori the only time that the merger rule should apply in real
estate transactions is where there exists identity in the content and sub-
stance of' the contested contract clause and the instrument of convey-
ance. This identity requirement may be looked at as the need for "par-
allelism" between the contract and the deed, whereby the separate
contract and deed provisions must address one and the same, identical,
substantive subject matter in order that merger pertain. 19' This paral-
lelism may be found to exist either 1) in actuality in the content of the
two separate instruments, or 2) by implication because the subject at
hand is so fundamental to real property that the law deems it embodied
188. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND
(1966).
189. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
190. Id. See also the very recent Florida case where the court, speaking of the
doctrine of merger in a trust context, stated that, "merger applies only when the legal
and equitable interests are held by one person and are coextensive and commensu-
rate-i.e., the legal estate and the equitable estate are the same." Contella v. Contella,
559 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis in original). "Coextensive"
is defined as having the same scope or boundaries. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 439 (1981). "Commensurate" is defined as equal in measure or
extent; corresponding in size, extent, amount or degree. Id. at 456.
191. 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1319, at 310 (1962).
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within the content of both instruments.
Carefully adhering to the common law roots of the merger doc-
trine, the early cases (e.g., Bull)192 seized upon four specific facets of
any real estate transaction as appropriate for operation of the rule even
if actual parallelism was missing: 1) title, 2) possession, 3) quantity,
and 4) emblements (these four aspects being sometimes referred to in
this article as the "Bull criteria"). 193 Why? If the subject matter of the
contract covenant sought to be enforced involves the title to the land, or
the possession of the land, or the quantity of land conveyed, or the
emblements of the land,"" then-reasons Bull-merger must certainly,
above all, be deemed to apply and the succeeding deed must be deemed
to extinguish the earlier contract covenant because each of these four
aspects are so basic, so essential in every real estate transaction that
the law infers the necessary parallelism even if the parties' documents
did not expressly manifest it. Simply put, these four aspects are inher-
ent in the land.
The "Bull criteria" emerged as the answer to the basic question in
these cases, which was phrased by the Bull court as being "a nice and
difficult question, to determine whether covenants contained in an
agreement for the sale of land are collateral to those providing for the
execution of the deed, or are so connected with it, as to be at an end
and become merged or satisfied in the execution of the deed."' 95 The
Bull court and the plethora of cases that followed and approved Bull
thus analyzed and ruled that these four legal aspects, title, possession,
quantity and emblements, are so basic to real property, are so "con-
nected with it,"' 96 that the law supplies their existence to Act II1 1 of
the real estate transaction play even when the parties themselves were
silent in that Act, thereby fulfilling the common law requirement of
identity and allowing the doctrine of merger to operate. And to com-
plete the equation, Bull further states the corollary to the rule, that
absent actual parallelism the lesser estate (the contract) will not be
deemed merged into the greater estate (the deed) if the contract cove-
nant sub judice involves some subject other than the title, possession,
192. Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 645.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. "Act II" being the closing document(s); e.g., the deed of conveyance, that
follows-after the intermission-Act I of the play, the contract of sale. See supra notes
21, 22 and accompanying text.
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quantity or emblements of the land (i.e., if the contract covenant does
not involve a "Bull criterion"). 198
Unfortunately, as the years passed, application of the doctrine of
merger to decide real estate transaction cases was extended well be-
yond situations involving the title, possession, quantity or emblements
of the land, and far into situations in which the two sets of provisions
(those in the contract, and those in the deed) lacked identity and did
not address the same subject.'99 The once clear and carefully circum-
scribed doctrine became a hackneyed rule of law, a buzzword or
"handy phrase"200 for the courts to invoke as justification for result-
oriented decisions denying post-closing enforcement of the contract of
sale. Demanding equal if not more time and attention, and perhaps a
product of modernization (could Bull have envisioned contract cove-
nants warranting the sound mechanical condition of the air condition-
ing equipment, or that water, sewer and electric service are available
with sufficient capacity for a 45,000 square foot office building?), 20 1 the
courts also found it necessary to develop a whole series of ad hoc excep-
tions to their supposed body of merger doctrine case law in order to
justify result-oriented decisions allowing enforcement of the contract
after the closing. Having lost its common law historical rudder, the
classic doctrine of merger as applied to real estate transactions was
bastardized and left floundering as an overextended rule, which re-
sulted in cultivation of a multitude of exceptions as an attempt to
maintain direction, but in reality served only to keep the "doctrine" on
a circuitous course. Sadly, the once noble and useful doctrine is being
swallowed by its exceptions.
Fleischer v. Hi Rise Homes, Inc.,202 a December 1988 Florida
case, however, steers us back to Bull to straighten our course in the
application of the doctrine of merger. Whether knowingly or fortui-
tously, Fleischer's unnecessary reference2 03 to Bull planted the seed
198. Bull, 9 Barb. at 644-45.
199. See, e.g., Soper v. Stine, 184 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(applying the doctrine of merger to buyer's covenants to make deferred payments for
inventory, fixtures and goodwill).
200. 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1319, at 310 (1962) ("The
phrase 'discharged by merger' . . . is merely a 'handy' phrase, of convenient uncer-
tainty and obscurity, that is used so as to avoid the necessity of clear thinking and
accurate analysis.").
201. Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
202. 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
203. Id. at 1107.
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that prompts re-evaluation of the merger rule from a refreshing doctri-
nal viewpoint, reminding us of the common law roots and requirements
of the rule. Hearken to the common law identity requirement, pro-
claims Bull, and recall that merger may occur only if the greater and
lesser estates coincide in the same person, in the same right, and for the
same purpose. Recall further that the identity requirement may be ful-
filled in actuality (by parallel content), °4 or by implication (by the
Bull criteria). But since all four Bull criteria may not necessarily be
the salient property characteristics appertaining today,20 5 most impor-
tantly recall the underlying philosophy of Bull, that the law will inject
the deed with the parallelism needed to fulfill the identity requirement
where the subject matter of the contract clause is a type that is inher-
ent in all real property. These are the cases of "true merger," allowing
for (nay, demanding) analysis and determination based on the doctrine
of merger in its purest form. In any other situation, that is in the ab-
sence of either 1) actual parallelism of covenants in both the contract
and the deed, or 2) parallelism inferred under the Bull umbrella of
those covenants so inherently connected to the land, the issue of
whether the covenant remains enforceable must be analyzed and de-
cided based on the theory of accord and satisfaction. °
Thus, the facts of any case seeking enforcement of a real estate
contract covenant after the closing must be critically analyzed in a two-
step process (which is sometimes hereinafter referred to as the "Two-
Step" analysis): 20 7
1. Does the requisite parallelism exist (either in actuality, or by
204. Merger operates to discharge contractual obligations, much as accord and
satisfaction, novation, or substitute contracts discharge, executory covenants. See 6 AR-
THUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1293, at 185 (1962).
205. Whether these particular four categories are still the only or the appropriate
areas that fulfill the identity requirement, is a separate issue; e.g., does anyone know
what an "emblement" is? However, identifying the specific areas of true merger is not
as important as understanding that the principle of "sameness" or identity of right and
purpose must apply to have a "true merger" situation; for once that element is taken
into account, identifying specific areas will naturally follow.
206. "The actual use of the merger rule can often be explained as a way of
regarding the delivery and acceptance of the deed as a sort of accord and satisfaction."
Reed v. Hasell, 340 A.2d 157, 161 (Del. Super. Ct. 1975) (interestingly, merger was
claimed by the purchaser to disallow seller's use of an exculpatory clause contained in
the contract).
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implication through a Bull criterion) to invoke operation of true
merger?
-If yes (a "TRUE MERGER" case), the covenant is
deemed extinguished and is unenforceable (absent fraud
or mistake).
-If no (a "NON-MERGER" case), we are not dealing
with an "exception" to the doctrine of merger. Merger
should not even be a topic of discussion. For want of
parallelism, merger cannot be called upon to decide the
case. Does this mean, therefore, that the covenant is au-
tomatically enforceable? Absolutely not! We need to
proceed to step number two, and ask
2. Has an accord and satisfaction occurred under this same set of
facts (in this "NON-MERGER" case)?
The topic of accord and satisfaction, and its various ramifications,
is justifiably the subject of numerous separate law review articles20'
and no pretense is here made to invade that territory. It is sufficient to
say that the term is used in this article in its generally accepted sense,
to identify that certain recognized method of discharging and terminat-
ing an existing obligation by the obligor rendering some performance
different from that originally obliged and the obligee accepting the sub-
stituted performance as full satisfaction of his rights;20 9 or, more simply
put-a settlement.2 10
Applied to contract and deed in real estate transactions, the theory
is that parties may-by this method called accord and satisfac-
tion-discharge (or be deemed to have discharged) obligations existing
under their contract for the sale of property by fulfilling substituted
agreements or by rendering some performance acceptable to the other
party even though different from that originally contracted for. The
"accord" is the agreement (and therefore must be duly supported by
consideration) to give on the one hand, and to accept on the other
hand, something different from that originally and rightfully due, in
full discharge of the original rights and liabilities. The "satisfaction" is
208. See Scott J. Burnham, A Primer On Accord & Satisfaction, 47 MONT. L.
REV. 1 (1986); Joseph C. Sleeth, Jr., Comment, Executory Accord, Accord and Satis-
faction, and Novation - The Distinctions 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 185 (1974); Note, Con-
tracts, Accord & Satisfaction, Liquidated Debt, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 279 (1940).
209. 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1276, at 115 (1962).
210. Id. at 115. Settlement is defined as "Act or process of adjusting or deter-
mining .... ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1231 (5th ed. 1979).
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the execution or performance carrying out the substituted agree-
ment,211 evidenced in the real estate transaction typically by the deliv-
ery and acceptance of the deed.
Hence, in the "NON-MERGER" case (which now more accu-
rately should be called a "POSSIBLE ACCORD-SAT." case), the
parties have delivered and accepted closing document(s) that are differ-
ent (either by silence, or by some degree of conflict) from their original
contract. The issue for analysis in terms of a possible accord and satis-
faction becomes whether the parties by their manifested intentions and
actions during the executory period or at closing arrived at a substi-
tuted understanding-or by law must be deemed to have reached such
substitution-so that the delivery and acceptance of the closing docu-
ment constitutes fulfillment of that understanding and a discharge of
the original contract.
It is interesting to stop a moment and take note at this point that
the presumptions of result are exactly opposite each other in the opera-
tion of the two theories under discussion (although this consequence
should be of no influence in determining which theory is applicable
under a specific set of facts). The presumption under the merger rule is
that the contract covenant died; under accord and satisfaction, it is pre-
sumed to live. Under the doctrine of merger, the contract is deemed
extinguished and therefore unenforceable, unless fraud or mistake can
be shown. Under the theory of accord and satisfaction, the contract
covenant is presumed to survive and thus be enforceable, unless it can
be shown that the parties agreed otherwise. This theme weaves its way
through the following analysis of several recent Florida cases, and we
return to this topic and its significance, infra,21 2 at the conclusion of
this section.
Not surprisingly, if we analyze some of the recent Florida
"merger" cases213 through the Two-Step process we expose that what
have heretofore been labelled as the familiar "exceptions" to merger,
are actually misapplications of the doctrine and its body of departures.
Because parallelism is lacking, the cases are not submissive to true
merger. Thus, these "exceptions" should be cast aside, and these cases
should be viewed more clearly and honestly in the context and theorem
of accord and satisfaction. As an example of this strategy, let us re-
211. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 417 cmt. a (1932); 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1276 (1962).
212. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
213. The cases listed in APPENDIX infra.
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examine several of the recent Florida cases that involved sellers' cove-
nants negating code violations in the property,2 and analyze whether
the parties expressly or impliedly agreed during the executory period
that the particular seller's liability under said covenant would termi-
nate al: closing (for otherwise, his liability carries on).
In each of these cases, Steinberg, Fraser, and Sager,2 15 the respec-
tive seller represented or warranted in the contract of sale, but not in
the deed of conveyance, that there existed no violations of city codes or
ordinances in the property; and in each case, the purchaser closed and
later brought suit for breach of the contract covenant. In Steinberg and
Sager, the contract was held enforceable; in Fraser, the contract was
held unenforceable.
Under the Two-Step analysis, we first probe for parallelism, either
actual ,or by implication.21 6 The reported facts in all three cases disclose
no covenants against code violations contained in any of the deeds,21 7
and such silence is typical.21 8 Hence, there is no actual parallelism.
Can parallelism be inferred under the Bull fundaments? 219 Covenants
against code violations fall neither within any of the four specific Bull
criteria nor within the "inherent-in-the-land" rationale of Bull;220
hence, the facts and logic compel a negative response to the inquiry of
Step One-these three cases are not candidates for "true merger." We
now proceed to Step Two.
Studied from the viewpoint of accord and satisfaction, the cardinal
facts in Fraser are that the purchaser discovered the code violations
during the executory period, confronted his seller with them, and stated
his intention not to close.
However, after the seller threatened suit, the purchaser did close
the transaction and he accepted the deed and possession of the prop-
214. See Sager v. Turner, 402 So. 2d 1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Fra-
ser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App, 1978); Steinberg v. Bay
Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
215. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1282; Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 533; Steinberg, 363 So. 2d
at 59.
216. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
217. See Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283; Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 533; Steinberg, 363
So. 2d at 59.
218. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.02-.03 (1990) (statutorily prescribed form of
warranty deed).
219. See Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641, 645 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); see also supra
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erty. This interaction between purchaser and seller during the execu-
tory period and the resolution of their confrontation could well be seen
as an accord, and of course closing the purchase and accepting the deed
constituted the satisfaction. By his actions, the purchaser in Fraser is
deemed to have agreed to acceptance of the property "as is," as he saw
it with his own eyes.22' Therefore, the contract covenant was correctly
held unenforceable, not by the operation of merger but by an accord
and satisfaction. 2
However, in Steinberg223 and Sager " there was no evidence of an
accord during the executory period. Again, analyzing these cases from
the viewpoint of accord and satisfaction, we start with the presumption
that the seller's liability under his contract warranty against present
code violations remains viable until exhausted by the statute of limita-
tions.225 Was there any action by purchaser and seller between the con-
tract signing and the passage of the deed in either of these cases to
evidence an understanding that seller's liability should end any earlier?
Combing the facts in both cases, we find none. Significantly, although
not singularly controlling, knowledge of the code violations came to
light after the respective closings in both Steinberg and Sager;226 thus,
there could be no justification for supposing an accord based upon pur-
chaser's resolution of he had been personally aware of prior to closing
such as the purchaser in Fraser.227 Moreover, there are no other facts
apparent in either Steinberg or Sager to indicate any other intention by
the parties to amend, modify or substitute their original agreement.
There being no evidence of an "accord," the closing cannot be viewed
as a "satisfaction" in either of these cases, and the earlier contract cov-
enant lived on to be enforced in both cases. 2 8
Any number of the other recent Florida "merger" cases229 could
likewise be analyzed from the Two-Step viewpoint suggested above.230
Hopefully, a few more examples will be illustrative of the thesis sug-
221. Fraser, 364 So. 2d at 534 (purchaser who closes with knowledge of a breach
of a contractual covenant is barred, by merger, from suing under the contract).
222. Id.
223. Steinberg, 363 So. 2d at 58.
224. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1282.
225. Id. at 1283; Steinberg 363 So. 2d at 59.
226. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283; Steinberg 363 So. 2d at 59.
227. See supra note 221.
228. Sager, 402 So. 2d at 1283; Steinberg 363 So. 2d at 59.
229. See APPENDIX infra.
230. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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gested herein, that merger has become just a buzzword and that these
cases clamor for deeper analysis. In Campbell v. Rawls,2"' for instance,
plaintiffs-purchasers' cause of action brought after the closing was
based on seller's breach of that part of the contract of sale that pro-
vided: "Seller warrants air conditioning and heating systems, . . . to be
in working order at time of closing." 32 The court affirmed enforcement
of the contract, stating that "the warranty in this case is the type of
independent covenant generally excepted from the merger doctrine.1"23
Under the Two-Step analysis, was the topic of merger even germane to
the court's consideration of the case? That is, was this case a potential
"true merger" situation? The deed was apparently silent (as is typi-
cal)23" with respect to the condition of the air conditioning and heating
systems, so there was no actual parallelism. The only remaining in-
quiry, then, is whether the mechanics of heating and cooling systems
"look to," or are so "connected with," the land2 35 as to be deemed inef-
faceable to the real estate transaction. Assuming a negative response to
this inquiry (the answer suggested by Bull, its legacy, and the dictates
of common law),236 there cannot possibly be true merger. Step Two,
then, calls for scrutiny of the facts in search of possible accord and
satisfaction. Interestingly, the seller's airconditioning warranty quoted
above 23 7 went on to provide that "Buyer, at his expense, may inspect
such systems [three] days prior to Closing, and in the event discrepan-
cies exist, Seller will repair same at Seller's expense." Buyers (plain-
tiffs) did not inspect prior to closing, for had they done so their action
could well have been viewed as the same "accord" as our previous anal-
ysis imputed to the purchaser in Fraser.38
The court in Campbell specifically addressed the question of
whether the above-quoted "three-day" clause made it incumbent on the
buyers to critique the equipment prior to closing, and the court re-
231. 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
232. Id. at 745.
233. Id. at 746.
234. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.02-.03 (1990) (statutorily prescribed form of
warranty deed).
235. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
236. See Bull v. Willard, 9 Barb. 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); see also supra notes
194-96 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text. The court achieved the
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sponded in the negative, stating: "[W]e construe the plain language of
the agreement to mean that the [buyers] were not required to inspect
the premises three days before closing and report discrepancies [in or-
der] to preserve their rights under the warranty."23 9 The reported facts
in Campbell reveal no other suggestion of a superseding agreement or
mutually agreed substituted performance.24 0 Hence, since the contract
is presumed to live unless an accord and satisfaction be shown, the
plaintiffs' cause of action for breach of contract should justifiably be
sustained under this analysis. Same result; different theory. The court
reached its conclusion to enforce the contract through exceptions to the
merger doctrine;2"' our audit through the Two-Step process and the
context of accord and satisfaction, which we proffer as the more intel-
lectually honest approach, reaches the same result.
American National Self Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar42 can well serve
as another of the recent Florida cases to be looked at from the new
Two-Step perspective. The plaintiff-buyer there sued his seller, we re-
call,243 for breach of the seller's representations and warranties under
the contract of sale "that water, sewer and electric service are presently
available at the property line or lines of the premises with sufficient
capacity to accommodate a 45,000 sq. ft. office/warehouse building;"2"
and the cause of action was allowed, over the objection of merger, by
virtue of several of the recognized exceptions to the merger rule. 45 The
reported facts specifically state that the deed contained no warranty
regarding the availability of water, sewer or electric service. Testing for
true merger, there surely was no actual parallelism. The inquiry once
again then becomes whether these covenants (about the availability of
water, sewer and electric service) are sufficiently inbred, intrinsic and
deep-rooted in the land so as to justify an implication of the identity
necessary for true merger.
The American National court was certainly on the right track
when it reviewed and recited roughly fifteen cases from Florida and
other jurisdictions that demonstrated the dichotomy between the types
of clauses that are "usually included in the terms of a deed" and there-
239. Campbell, 381 So. 2d at 746.
240. Id. at 744.
241. Id. at 746.
242. 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
243. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
244. American Nat'l, 521 So. 2d at 304.
245. Id. at 305-06.
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fore merger is mandated, versus those types of clauses that "call for
acts by the seller which go beyond merely conveying clear title and
placing the purchaser in possession of the property" in which cases
merger does not apply. 46 Indeed, the court's conclusion negating
merger with regard to this seller's warranty of utilities availability was
somewhat reminiscent of Bull when it reasoned that covenant "is not
an agreement usually contained in a deed, related to the condition of
the title to property, or satisfied by the execution and delivery of the
deed.124 7 The court thus closely approached the "true merger" concept,
but did not quite reach it. All that was missing at this point was an
analysis of why merger did or did not apply in the fifteen or sixteen
instances summarized, namely because the requisite identity in "right"
and "purpose," as required by the common law for the merger of es-
tates,2" 8 either did or did not exist in the respective sets of contract and
deed covenants. Instead, the American National court swerved to the
''exceptions" sidetrack to overcome the merger defense.
The court, having reached the correct conclusion in Step One that
true merger was unavailing, was then ready for analysis under Step
Two, as to whether plaintiff's cause of action on the contract might
have been precluded by reason of accord and satisfaction. Again, the
court was on the right track, and did in fact recognize that the parties
might have intended to reach an accord and satisfaction but sufficient
facts simply were not in the record.2 49 Accordingly, the court remanded
the case for further evidentiary hearing, at which time defendant-seller
might "[attempt] to prove, by evidence other than the deed itself, that
the parties intended that the warranty of the contract of sale was to be
extinguished by the conveyance of the property;"2 50 i.e., that the parties
intended and reached an accord and satisfaction.
Another of the recent Florida cases, Southpointe Development,
Inc. v, Cruikshank,25' serves to illustrate that true merger is alive and
well, as is a "true exception" to true merger, and that modern-day
cases may scrupulously be resolved through analysis that extends only
through Step One of the Two-Step process. Although it does not cite
Bull, Southpointe clearly supports the Bull criteria. As recalled from
246. Id.
247. Id. at 306.
241. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
249. American Nat'l, 521 So. 2d at 306.
250. Id.
251. 484 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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earlier discussion,"' the seller in Southpointe agreed to sell to the pur-
chasers the "Sunrise Golf Course Club House, cart sheds, and mainte-
nance sheds, ' 253 and after closing it was discovered that the deed failed
to convey the maintenance shed property; the purchasers sued.
At first blush this would appear to be a modern-day, open-and-
shut case absolving defendant on the basis of true merger since it in-
volved one of the four specific criteria of Bull, the quantity of land
conveyed. Accordingly, the answer to the Step One question254 is "yes,"
and it would seem that the trial court's summary judgment for defend-
ant-seller should be affirmed without much ado: Covenants respecting
the quantity of land to be conveyed merge into the deed and are extin-
guished. 55 However, just as there exist limited situations of true
merger, so too are there limited situations that constitute legitimate
exceptions to true merger, 2 6 and one of those situations happens to be
in the case of mistake. 5 Thus, the court in Southpointe correctly re-
versed the summary judgment for seller grounded on merger and re-
manded the case for trial on the "unresolved material issues of fact
relating to the parties' intention to convey the property in question and
to whether the omission was a mutual mistake."2 58 The doctrine of
merger thus remains viable to factual situations that embrace the req-
uisites of "true merger," but so too is at least one rightful exception
thereto, mistake-even with respect to such core Bull elements as
"quantity" and "title. ' 25 9
Nevertheless, and of most significance to analyzing the "merger"
cases from the Two-Step viewpoint, Southpointe teaches by example
that a true merger case may properly be resolved wholly at Step One.
Having fulfilled the requisites to qualify as a case of true merger, the
Southpointe real estate transaction must be steadfastly viewed as func-
252. See supra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
253. Southpointe, 484 So. 2d at 1362.
254. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
256. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. The classic exceptions to true
merger are mistake, accident and fraud. The courts generally (and correctly) do not
refer to these as exceptions, but instead simply say that merger "does not apply" here.
See, e.g., Southpointe Dev. Inc. v. Cruikshank, 484 So. 2d 1361, 1362 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1986) ("[T]he principle of Merger does not apply in cases of mistake.")
(emphasis added).
257. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
258. Southpointe, 484 So. 2d at 1362 (emphasis added).
259. 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 604 (1960).
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tus officio, and it would be doctrinally unsound to consider accord and
satisfaction, if it is factually determined on remand that there was no
mistake. Southpointe further illustrates, however, that progression to
Step Two may nevertheless be warranted in a true merger case if in
fact the omission in the deed was due to mistake, for even though the
plaintiff is saved from the doom of merger by reason of the mistake, it
is still conceivable that the actions of the parties during the executory
period might evidence an accord that was fully satisfied by the delivery
and acceptance of the deed.
In bringing this section to a close, it could not be more fitting than
to harken back to the earliest Florida merger case of this century, Ga-
bel v. Simmons,26 as the bellwether of the Two-Step thesis propounded
herein. With regard to Step One (whether the requisite parallelism ex-
ists to permit the operation of true merger), 261 Gabel warned us, 'tho
superficially, not to become engulfed in the merger rule where "not
appropriate. '26  Yet Gabel itself and at least twenty-six subsequent
Florida appellate cases became so mired,263 and it was not until
Fleischer v. Hi Rise Homes, Inc.264 in December, 1988-by its refer-
ence to Bull-that we are directed out of our quag.
In rejecting defendant's contention that plaintiffs' action on the
contract of sale was barred by merger (i.e., in finding "exceptions" to
the merger rule), the court in Gabel took pains to point out that it was
"not appropriate" for a closing document to include a clause of the
type on which the Gabel breach of contract action was based 26 5 (the
provision for refund of buyers' purchase price if they were dissatisfied
with the property). Conversely, if it was appropriate for the closing
document to include such a provision, then it follows that merger
would apply. This initial stage of the court's analysis concurs in theory
with Bull and with Step One of the Two-Step thesis: If the requisite
parallelism does not exist in order to invoke true merger, the contract
covenant is prima facie enforceable. The court then could have set
about Step Two, checking for an accord and satisfaction, but it didn't.
Rather, the court adjudicated the "merger" issue straightforward on
260. 129 So. 777 (Fla. 1930).
261. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
262 Gabel, 129 So. at 778.
263. Id. at 778; see also APPENDIX infra.
264. 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
265. Gabel, 129 So. at 778.
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the basis of several of the well-known "exceptions" to merger,6 Nev-
ertheless, we can advance our analysis to Step Two and scrutinize the
facts of Gabel to see if the elements of an accord and satisfaction were
fulfilled.
Recall,26 7 that plaintiff-buyer here sued his seller for refund of all
monies paid (deposit and down payment at closing) based on a contract
covenant by seller that "[i]f purchaser is dissatisfied after 90 days
from closing, all monies paid shall be returned with 10% interest."26
Purchasers requested (and then, demanded) return of their money on
numerous occasions: Before, at, and after expiration of the ninety days.
About a month after the expiration of the 90 days, defendant-seller
attempted to mollify plaintiffs and attempted to delay return of the
money so as "to allow them (plaintiffs) to dispose of the property at a
profit to themselves," and promised to return the money at an extended
date "if plaintiffs were still dissatisfied with their purchase. ' 269 Was
there an accord and satisfaction under these facts? Impossible. The
covenant contemplated performance after closing,270 and all of the con-
versations and interaction of buyer and seller regarding the requested
refund took place after closing. None of the activity or the conversa-
tions took place during the executory period, so there is nothing to sup-
port an accord, respecting which the closing might have in any fashion
constituted a satisfaction. Perhaps the more relevant question is
whether the parties' post-closing activities constituted a novation, 271
and while the court didn't actually raise this question, it answered it by
ruling that the "new promise" to return the money at the extended
date, which promise was made approximately 120 days after the clos-
ing, "did not affect the plaintiffs' right to a return of the money. "272
The above discussion of several recent Florida cases not only il-
luminates the more honest and clear thinking of the "Two-Step" analy-
sis, but also suggests why the modern trend of the cases is "pro-life" to
the contract, favoring the enforceability of more and more contract
266. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
267. See notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
268. Gabel, 129 So. at 777 (emphasis added).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. The "first cousin" of accord and satisfaction. See 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1300, at 228 (1962) ("A novation is like accord and satisfac-
tion. ... ).
272. Gabel, 129 So. at 778.
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provis;ions.27 3 For while the predominant number of recent decisions has
been in favor of sustaining enforceability of the contract provisions
through "exceptions" to merger, what these statistics really demon-
strate is a shift in presumptions corresponding with the shift in theories
suggested above-the shift from merger to accord and satisfaction.
Under the doctrine of merger, of course, the contract covenant is pre-
sumed to have perished, but under the accord and satisfaction theory,
the "more appropriate" theory in most cases as suggested above, the
covenant is presumed mortal, viable and enforceable. 74 The recent sta-
tistics overwhelmingly bear out the trend towards enforcement of the
contract covenants.2 75 So in the shift of doctrines, and in the shift of
presumptions, the burden of proof also changes from he who seeks to
enforce the contract, to he who seeks to prevent enforcement. And per-
haps, as touched on in the next section,276 this is how it "should be"
from a policy standpoint.
VII. CONCLUSION
So now we reach the point where we lean back, acknowledge the
problem, the confusion and the misapplication of the doctrine, and ask
what can we do to rectify this situation.
More specifically, our travels have revealed that real estate buyers
and sellers are repeatedly confronted with post-closing legal problems
that could have been resolved by their contract covenants if raised pre-
closing, but weren't. So the issue at this point in time (after passage of
the deed) becomes: Is it too late? Not because of a statute of limita-
tions; not because of laches; not because of caveat emptor or the parol
evidence rule (although there certainly is overlap);2 77 but because of a
notion that all good things must (at some point in time) come to an
end. 271l
From a broad, social policy perspective, we can view the problem
thusly::
273. See APPENDIX infra; see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
274. 6 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1276 (1962).
275. See APPENDIX infra; see also supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
276. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
277. See 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573-76, at 356
(1960).
278. "Some time an end there is of every deed." CHAUCER, THE KNIGHTES
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Bestowing effect upon the doctrine of merger is typically a boon to
the seller. 279 He stands released and discharged from otherwise en-
forceable contractual obligations. He got away with it, to the detri-
ment of his buyer.
Refusing to recognize merger allows survival of contract covenants
past the closing, and is typically a boon to the buyer. 280 He made
his bed; he slept in it; and he gets a chance to re-make the bed if
his slumber is disturbed. He gets a second bite at the apple, to the
detriment of his seller.
Several ideas are posed as possible resolutions to the problem: 1)
Statutory legislation; 2) Adoption of a "standard" provision on merger
in widely used form contracts; 3) Educated and tailored contract prep-
aration; and 4) Enlightened judicial construction.
A. Statutory Legislation
Legislate a hard and fast rule by statute. For example, all cove-
nants of the contract of sale shall survive delivery of the deed. Or, all
covenants of the contract shall be deemed extinguished by merger into
the deed. Or, should the statute carve out particular contract covenants
that shall always survive closing, and specify other contract covenants
and subject matters that shall always be deemed extinguished and un-
enforceable? And if so, then which type of covenants shall survive, and
which shall be extinguished? And, can statutory language be crafted to
clearly identify the particular subject matters that shall always fall into
one category or the other?2 81 Perhaps this short series of questions
demonstrates the futility of seeking to resolve the problem by statute.
Nevertheless, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws did propose resolution of the merger problem by stat-
ute, in its adoption of the Uniform Land Transaction Act (ULTA). 282
279. The deed typically contains fewer seller covenants than the contract. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. § 689.02-.03 (1990) (statutorily prescribed form of warranty deed).
Strict merger reduces the number of covenants, by operating to enforce only the cove-
nants in the deed. The seller then by the operation of merger emerges burdened with
fewer obligations when he is freed from the contract covenants.
280. The buyer, conversely, typically wants all of the contractual covenants
enforceable.
281. See infra notes 282-85 and accompanying text.
282. The act was approved by the Conference in 1975. See UNIFORM LAND
1218 [Vol. 16
48
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 6
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss3/6
Ginsburg
Proposed Section 1-309 of the ULTA essentially would have eliminated
the doctrine of merger, in that it provided as follows:
Acceptance by a buyer or a secured party of a deed or other instru-
ment of conveyance is not of itself a waiver or renunciation of any
of his rights under the contract under which the deed or other in-
strument of conveyance is given and does not of itself relieve any
party of the duty to perform all of his obligations under the
contract. 8"
For whatever reasons (certainly going beyond the sole issue of merger),
the ULTA was never adopted by even one state,2 84 and as of June,
1991 "the ULTA is a dead horse."2 " Perhaps this too demonstrates the
futility of endeavoring to resolve the merger issue through legislation.
B. Form Contracts
Adoption of a standard position on merger by inclusion of an ap-
propriate paragraph in the "standard form" real estate contract(s) in
prevalent use by the bar and by real estate agents in the state, is an-
other suggestion to resolve the merger problem.
Certainly, the courts respect the parties' manifested intent that the
contract covenants shall, or shall not, survive the closing of the transac-
tion.28 Several popular printed-form contracts are in use in Florida to-
day, and all of them are silent with regard to whether the covenants
thereof' survive passage of the deed.287 Inclusion of a "standard"
TRANSACTIONS ACT, 13 ULTA. 472 (1977) (history of the Act); Dunham, Merger by
Deed-Was It Ever Automatic 10 GA. L. REV. 419 (1976) (comprehensive examina-
tion by a Commissioner on Uniform State Laws and the Chairman of the Special Com-
mittee which drafted the Uniform Act).
283. UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT § 1-309, 13 U.L.T.A. 500-01 (1977)
(repealing the doctrine of merger for realty just as the U.C.C. made merger inapplica-
ble for goods). See generally UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607 (buyer can still sue
for breach of contract after acceptance of tender); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-
608 (buyer can revoke acceptance of goods).
284. UNIFORM LAND TRANSACTIONS ACT, 13 U.L.T.A. 469 (1977 and Supp. 1
1991); see also U.L.TA. DIRECTORY OF ACTS (1991 Pamph.).
285. Telephone interview with John McCabe of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Unification of State Laws (June 19, 1991).
286. See Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (con-
tract covenants were implicitly deemed to survive the closing).
287. An examination of ten prevalent form contracts used in Florida revealed no
mention of any provisions for the survival or the discharge of contract covenants upon
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merger provision would fill the void of this silence.
For example, The Florida Bar and the Florida Association of
Realtors have for many years jointly prepared and utilized a standard,
printed-form Contract for Sale and Purchase,288 and a joint committee
comprised of members from both of those associations continually re-
views, revises and expands the form contract. 8 9 In its present form
(latest revision, January, 1991) the contract contains no provision re-
garding merger. Similar to the proposal expressed above with regard to
statutorily legislating the answer to the merger question, the proposi-
tion here is to "legislate" the answer by an omnibus clause in the
printed-form contract, addressing survival vel non of all of the cove-
nants, warranties, representations and other agreements of the parties
as contained in that "standard" contract. As with the above statutory
proposal, however, the same series of questions come to mind. Should
the "standard" be that all covenants survive? Or, that all covenants are
merged? Or, that some particular covenants concerning specified areas
are deemed merged, but other specified covenants are deemed to sur-
vive? And, if so, which shall merge, and which shall survive? Could the
bar and the Realtors ever concur on answers to the foregoing questions
sufficiently to reach a "standard" acceptable to the real estate industry
in our state? And, can we draft adequate language that will clearly
identify those types of covenants intended to fall within either of the
specified categories, or are the subject matters inherent in any real es-
tate transaction of such nature as to defy clear expression in this type
of dichotomy? Again, perhaps these questions demonstrate the futility
of attempting to resolve the question of merger by a standard-form
contract.
Nevertheless, the real estate professionals of the state of New
York did just that in their latest, very recently revised standard-form
Residential Contract of Sale,290 providing that:
delivery of the deed. Among those surveyed were, the Florida Association of Realtors
and The Florida Bar (FAR/BAR) Contract for Sale and Purchase, the Miami Board
of Realtors Contract for Sale and Purchase, and the Coral Gables Board of Realtors
Contract of Purchase and Sale.
288. Florida Association of Realtors and The Florida Bar, FAR/BAR Contract
for Sale and Purchase (1991).
289. See generally FAR/BAR Contract Preparation Manual (1988). This man-
ual describes the Realtor-Attorney Joint Committee responsible for creating and updat-
ing the form contract, and generally explains the purpose of, and methodology for, the
preparation of the FAR/BAR real estate Contract for Sale and Purchase.
290. See N.Y. L.J., Mar 13, 1991, at 40. The article describes the creation of
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Except as otherwise expressly set forth in this contract, none of
Seller's covenants, representations, warranties or other obligations
contained in this contract shall survive Closing.2"'
The "except as otherwise expressly set forth" introductory phrase to
this omnibus provision borders on the humorous (were it not that multi-
thousands or millions of dollars in real estate value rides on this form)
when it becomes apparent by combing through this New York form
contract that at least seven separate contractual covenants of this docu-
ment are "excepted out" and are expressly stated to survive Closing.2 92
On the other hand, this revelation may well reflect admirably upon the
diligence of the members of the four committees that jointly prepared
this latest revised form document,293 for they obviously gave serious
thought and consideration to determining on a subject-by-subject basis
which provisions shall live and which shall die. Nevertheless, it must be
noted that their general conclusion as evidenced by the omnibus provi-
sion quoted above294 was to sustain the doctrine of merger, while the
conclusion of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws under the
ULTA section quoted above 295 was to "repeal" the doctrine of merger.
C. Contract Preparation; Draftsmanship
The reported facts in the Florida cases analyzed in this article 296
reflect that each of the respective contracts of sale was silent as to
whether the covenant sub judice was meant to survive; specifically, the
contracts did not contain survival or merger provisions, 97 Of course,
had those contracts addressed the merger issue it is doubtful that we
would have had the benefit of the case law generated by their litigation,
Form A-1.25, Residential Contract of Sale by a joint committee chaired by Bernard M.
Rifkin, consisting of representatives from the Real Property Section of the New York
State Bar Association, the New York State Land Title Association and the Commit-
tees on Real Property Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and
of the New York County Lawyer's Association. Form A-125 is available through Julius
Blumberg Publishers, Inc., New York City.
291. Paragraph I I(c), Form A-] 25, Residential Contract of Sale, (New York).
292. Paragraphs 16(c), 17, 18(e), 21(c), 27, 28(f), 28(g), Form A-125, Residen-
tial Contract of Sale, (New York).
293. See supra note 290 for a list of the four committees.
294. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
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because as noted earlier 98 the Florida courts have given assurance that
if the parties do state their intent regarding survival or merger in the
original agreement, the court will respect that expression.2 99 Thus, an-
other suggestion to resolve the merger problem is that the contract
preparer handcraft the parties' intentions into the original contract of
sale by 1) expressly stating which covenants shall survive and which
shall not, 00 or 2) more realistically, setting forth an omnibus survival
or merger clause with specifically identified exceptions. 30 1 This obvi-
ously requires substantial attention to detail in the drafting of the
agreement of purchase and sale.
In any particular real estate transaction, there will be various pro-
visions that-if the buyer and seller were to stop and think about
them-they would wish to have survive closing; and likewise, there will
be other provisions that-upon thoughtful consideration-the parties
would choose to have extinguished as of the time of closing. Careful
consideration and draftsmanship at the time of preparing the contract
would avoid subsequent litigation by resolving which provisions will
survive, and which will die by merger.3 2 The difficulty with this propo-
sal is that typical real estate buyers, sellers and agents are not aware
of, much less would they stop and think about, the doctrine of merger
when negotiating a purchase and sale of real property, and most con-
tracts of sale are entered into without the advice of counsel and are
signed before the attorney ever sees the agreement. The real estate in-
dustry (buyers, sellers, brokers, and even many attorneys) is simply not
educated to the doctrine of merger, so that the likelihood of considering
the impact of merger and providing for it in the original contract is
diminutive except in the more sophisticated and high dollar-volume
transactions. Moreover, even if the parties or their representatives were
aware of the merger issue pre-contract, it would merely add one more
stumbling block to the negotiation process, pervading virtually every
paragraph of the contract. Naturally, every buyer would like most (if
not all) of his seller's representations, warranties and covenants to sur-
vive closing; and the typical seller wants to stand released of as much
298. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 286.
300. For example, "[tlhe provisions of this paragraph shall [or shall not] survive
the closing of the transaction contracted for hereunder and the delivery of the deed
conveying the subject property."
301. E.g., an omnibus provision similar to the New York standard form contract
provision (paragraph 11 (c), thereof) as quoted supra note 291 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 300-01.
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liability as possible once he has closed and "walked away."
Notwithstanding, silence on the issue of merger is no virtue since,
as emphasized by the review of cases in this article, there can be no
reliance on the courts for consistency in either upholding or circum-
venting the doctrine of merger. Thus, given the opportunity,303 there
can be no excuse for counsel failing to tailor appropriate merger and
survival provisions into careful real estate contract preparation. This is
especially so in recognition of 1) the conflicting presumptions that re-
sult from applying either the merger doctrine or the theory of accord
and satisfaction, 04 and 2) the conflicting predilections of typical buyers
and sellers of real property. "' Recognizing the various consequences
conceivable from the several juxtapositions of these two sets of con-
flicts, it is incumbent on the prudent real property attorney to protect
his client through advice, counsel and documentation concerning
merger and survival provisions.
D. Enlightened Judicial Construction
When all is said and done, the real merger problems will rear their
heads in controversies in judicium venire:
The likelihood of merger legislation is remote, if at all.306 Com-
plete resolution by express contract provisions, whether standard-
form3"7 or tailor-made, 308 is optimistic utopia but not a practical real-
ity. Thus, the ultimate resolution'of the veritable merger problem's will
remain in the hands of the courts, and the most productive and re-
warding accomplishment of this article will be to suggest that the
courts discard tunnel-vision merger rules and instead analyze potential
merger cases through the Two-Step process formulated,309 discussed,31 0
and justified1 ' above. Apply the doctrine of merger (and its resultant
303. I.e., assuming that counsel has been engaged prior to the parties having
executed their contract of sale (which is generally not the case in the realities of the
real estate industry).
304. See supra notes 212, 273-74 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 282-85 and accompanying text (description of the quiet
demise of a similar proposal).
307. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 213-76 and accompanying text.
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discharge of contractual obligations) only in cases of "true merger;" in
all other cases, enforce the contractual obligations as covenanted by sui
juris parties until terminated by the applicable statute of limitations,
unless a substituted agreement-an accord and satisfaction-can be
proven. This procedure comports with the basic common law tenets of
the merger doctrine; it comports with the strong trend of recent deci-
sions bent on contract enforcement; and this enlightened process of
analysis and construction also conforms with our "current notions of
justice, equity and fair dealing" as well as the current needs of our
society.3 1 2
312. See, e.g. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985) (court would not
allow the doctrine of caveat emptor to shield a seller because to do so would fly in the
face of society's needs). This article does not propose the frustration of society's needs
by a rigid application of merger. Rather, this paper proposes a legally correct applica-
tion of merger which will fulfill society's need for equity as well as judicial consistency.
See Contos v. Lipsky, 433 So. 2d 1242, 1247-48 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
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APPENDIX OF FLORIDA CASES DEALING WITH THE DOCTRINE
OF MERGER*
1. Seller's covenant to refund purchase price if buyer is dissatisfied
with property after ninety days. Gabel v. Simmons, 129 So. 777 (Fla.
1930) (merger rule not applied).
2. Seller's oral** representations of good right to convey, freedom
from adverse claims and encumbrances, market value and development
prospects, and covenant to resell at a profit. White v. Crandall, 143 So.
871 (Fla. 1932) (merger rule applied).
3. Seller's covenant subordinating the purchase money mortgage to
an anticipated construction loan first mortgage. Graham v. Common-
wealth Life Ins., 154 So. 335 (Fla. 1934) (merger rule not applied).
4. Buyer's covenant to assume existing mortgage. Riddle v. Col-
liver, 150 So. 880 (Fla. 1934) (merger rule not applied).
5. The contract contained restrictive covenants regarding the use
of the land; e.g., only residential use, size and cost of structure, and
race restrictions. Volunteer Sec. Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1947)
(merger rule applied).
6. Seller's covenant to convey by warranty deed. St. Clair v. City
Bank & Trust, 175 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (merger
rule applied).
7. Buyer's covenants to make deferred payments for the inventory,
fixtures, and good will of a business. The business was located on cer-
tain real property also sold to same buyer, regarding which buyer gave
seller a purchase money note and mortgage. Soper v. Stine, 184 So. 2d
892 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (merger rule applied).
8. Buyer's covenant to pay balance of purchase price in shares of
stock. Milu Inc. v. Duke, 204 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967)
(merger rule not applied).
9. Seller's covenant that the property is free and clear of all en-
cumbrances. Stephan v. Brown, 233 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1970) (merger rule applied).
* The cases are listed in chronological order. The 22 cases listed at Numbers six
through 27 are those referred to in the article as the "recent Florida cases." See supra
note 56 and accompanying text. Of these 22 recent Florida cases, the merger rule was
applied eight times-dicta indicated that it would have been applied two more
times-while the courts declined to apply the merger rule in the remaining twelve
cases.
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10. Contract provision that the purchase money mortgage would
contain a 30-day grace period. Uwanawich v. Gaudini, 334 So. 2d 116
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (merger rule applied).
11. Seller's representation as to compliance with city code respect-
ing the quantity of rentable units in subject apartment building prop-
erty. Steinberg v. Bay Terrace Apartment Hotel, 363 So. 2d 58 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (merger rule not applied).
12. Seller's covenant against any city code violations. Fraser v.
Schoenfeld, 364 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (merger rule
applied).
13. Seller's covenant to convey title free and clear of all encum-
brances. Bennett v. Behring, 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979)
(merger rule applied).
14. Seller's warranty as to condition of air conditioning and heat-
ing system and provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing
party. Campbell v. Rawls, 381 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (merger rule not applied in either situation).
15. Contingency clause regarding purchaser obtaining all neces-
sary operating permits, and seller's covenant against violations of ordi-
nances, easements, and deed restrictions. Sager v. Turner, 402 So. 2d
1282 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (merger rule not applied in either
situation).
16. Seller's covenant of ingress and egress. Opler v. Wynne, 402
So. 2d 1309 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied, 412 So. 2d 472
(1982) (merger rule not applied).
17. Contract provisions specifying the terms and conditions for
partial release of the purchase money mortgage. Sun Ist Nat. Bank v.
Grinnell, 416 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (merger rule
applied).
18. Buyer's covenant to reconvey the property to seller if buyer
ever ceased using the property as his permanent residence. Peterson v.
Peterson, 431 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (merger rule
not applied).
19. Provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Gordon v. Bartlett, 452 So. 2d 1077 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(merger rule applied).
20. Seller's covenants to provide water and sewer services, grant
one year free golf and tennis club membership, and build a road for
access to certain parts of the property. Georskey v. Wild Flower Land-
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21. Seller's covenant to convey additional property; i.e., property
that was not included in the deed. Southpointe Dev. Inc. v. Cruik-
shank, 484 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (merger rule not
applied).
22. Seller's reservation of a life estate in a portion of the property.
Kidd v. Fowler, 498 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (merger
rule not applied).
23. Seller's covenants regarding the availability and capacity of
water, sewer, and electric services to the property. American Nat'l Self
Storage v. Lopez-Aguiar, 521 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(merger rule not applied).
24, Provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Fleischer v. Hi Rise Homes Inc., 536 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1988) (merger rule applied in dicta).
25. Seller's representations concerning the tenancy of parties in
possession. Durden v. Century 21 Compass Points, 541 So. 2d 1264
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (merger rule not applied).
26. Provision for awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
Burkett v. Rice, 542 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (merger
rule not applied).
27. Seller's covenant negating any violation of governmental re-
strictions. Field v, Perry, 564 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1990)
(merger rule applied in dicta).
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